This hand is an appropriate entry for No. 13. This hand is typical of the type of play you'll see with online play.
Second hand of an online tournament. Ten players at the table. The players involved in this hand all have a starting chip stack of 1,500 chips. The blinds start at 10/20. I am player C in this hand.
Players A & B fold. Player C limps in for 20. Player D folds. Player E calls for 20. Players fold to the Dealer who raises to 80. The blinds fold. Player C calls for 80, as does Player E. The pot is now 270.
The flop is A 9 2, with 2 spades. Player C bets 120 chips. Player E and the Dealer call. The pot is 630.
The turn is a 3 of diamonds. Player C bets 465. Player E calls and the Dealer calls. The pot is 2,025 chips.
The river is a 10 of spades. Player C checks. Player E goes all-in for 835 chips. The Dealer finally folds. Player C calls. The pot is 3,695 chips. Player C shows A 2, both hearts, for two pair. Player E shows J 5, both spades, for a flush. Player E wins the pot. Since Player C and Player E started the hand with equal stacks, Player C is now out of the tournament.
My thoughts on this hand:
Player C (me) limps in for 20 before the flop. There were no raised in front of Player C, and he was holding a suited Ace. A 2 is a little weak to be playing from early position, and often leads to problems when you pair your Ace as you are losing to anyone else with an Ace in their hand. Limping is okay, but you should be prepared to let it go if someone behind you raises big.
Player E calls with J 5, both spades. It is very common for online players to call with any two suited cards. I think online players like playing these type of hands, because if they can make a flush they are very likely to have the best hand.
The Dealer makes a big raise. The raise doesn't really represent much strength. With online play, I would imagine an player would make this raise in position holding anything from high pair, two high cards, any two suited cards, or two connected cards. This could also be a raise designed to represent strength, so that the raiser can take down the pot if the callers miss on the flop.
Player C calls the raise for another 60. This is a marginal call, but its probably justified on at least two fronts. First, we can't be sure A 2 isn't the best hand right now. As stated, the Dealer's raise could represent a wide range of holdings. Player E also limped, so Player E may not have much either. Second, the implied pot odds probably compels a call. If only the Dealer and Player C remain in the hand, then Player C is being offered to see a flop for an additional 60 chips and a total pot of 210. But since online play tends to be a little loose (or a very loose depending on your perspective), we could reasonably expect Player E to call the raise as well. In that case, Player C is being offered to see the flop for 60, and a total pot of 270 chips. Those pot odds make the call with A 2 okay. So I elected to call, prepared to get away from the hand if the flop was all blanks.
Instead, the flop hit Player C upside the head. The flop gave Player C two pair, while Player E now had a flush draw that would probably win the hand if a third spade appears on the board. We did not see what the Dealer was holding. Player C leads out for 120, or a little less than half the pot. I made the bet hoping to elicit a raise out of a player holding an Ace in their hand. My mistake is I did not make a big enough bet to deny Player E the pot odds for drawing to his flush. Although based on his call on the turn, I am not certain Player E would have folded to any bet. So Player E called the bet, as did the Dealer.
The turn was the 3 of diamonds. At this point, I am reasonably certain I am still in the lead. I am also sure at least one of the remaining players is holding a flush draw, while the other player probably has an Ace in his hand, or a high pair below the Ace on the board. Player C makes a bet of 465. This bet was about 3/4 of the pot and was intended to chase away the flush draws. Instead Player E quickly called. The Dealer also called. At this point I start to feel like I may be getting slow-played by one of the players.
I suppose I could have gone all-in on the turn. I figured someone was on a flush draw, so I could have protected myself by forcing that player to risk all of his chips before seeing the final card. There are two problems with that strategy. First, I am not sure Player E would have folded anyway. Player E seemed happy to risk large portions of his stack chasing his limited outs. Second, going all-in would potentially deny me extra bets if the other players held just a pair of aces or smaller two pairs. In the long run, I don't think going all-in at this point is the most profitable play. So, I made a decent size bet and took my chances with the river card.
The river was a disaster. The 10 of spades completed the flush draw. I had several options acting first. I could go all-in, I could check, or I could make a bet - probably in the area of 500 chips. I elected to check to see what Player E would do with the Dealer still to act behind him. Player E went all-in for his remaining chips. The Dealer folded, and I was now 90% sure Player E had two spades in his hand. Nevertheless, I elected to call, hoping instead Player E had an Ace in his hand. I wasn't shocked to see the J 5, as I often see online players calling big raised with any two suited cards.
Ultimately, I feel it was a mistake to call the all-in on the river since I was so sure Player E had the flush. Had I folded, I would still be alive in the tournament with 835 chips. Since the blinds were still 10/20, I still had ample time and opportunity to come from behind.
I won't try to justify Player E's play in this hand. Player E's strategy is a losing one over the long run, as he won't make his flush most of the time. However, I will try to explain his strategy. As I mentioned, playing with any two suited cards gives you two ways to win a hand. You'll either make a weird two-pair that will be hard to recognize, or maybe two of your cards will hit the board giving you a disguised three of a kind. Alternatively, you can hope to make a flush that more often than not will be the best hand. Again most often these cards won't connect and the player can get out of the hand. In this instances where you do connect, you could win a substantial pot. In this case, Player E ended the hand with about 3,700 chips. He now had a dominating chip stack and was in great position for the remainder of the tournament.
What do you expect out of online players? Feel free to compare notes in the comments section. Thanks for reading.
Wednesday, April 6, 2011
Saturday, April 2, 2011
Hand No. 12
This hand demonstrates the inherent danger of playing less than premium hands.
Blinds are 100/200, and its still early in this tournament. I have already devoted a lot of space in prior entries discussing how the rebuy option affects play and strategy, so I won't further belabor the point, other than to say all the players involved in this hand still had the option to rebuy. Each player has close to their starting stack of 16,000 chips.
Player A folds. Player B raises to 600. Player C raises to 1,600. Player D folds, Player E calls. Play folds around to Player B, who calls the extra 1,000 chips. The pot is 5,100.
The flop is Q J 4, with 2 clubs. Player B bets 2,000, Player C calls, and Player E folds. The pot is now 9,100.
The turn is the 8 of diamonds. Player B bets 4,000. Player C goes all-in for another 7,000 chips. Player B calls and just has Player C covered. The pot is 31,100 chips. Player B shows J 10, with no flush possibility. Player C shows pocket Jacks. Player B needs only a 9 to make a straight and win the pot.
The river is a 10. Player C's trip Jacks beats Player B's two pair, and Player C wins the pot.
My thoughts on the hand:
Player B makes a raise from early position with J 10. This is a pretty marginal hand to play from early position. You are only going to be called by hands that are beating you. Or worse, you might get a re-raise and then be forced to either dump the hand or commit more chips to the pot with a losing hand. In this case, Player B saw a re-raise and a call of the raise. Nevertheless, Player B calls with likely the third best hand.
A lot of players like to play with J 10. The player hopes to flop a straight or a draw to a straight with high cards on the board that pair their opponent's holdings. You see this type of play online quite often. Players will call a pre-flop raise with J 10, hoping their opponent is playing A K or something similar. The player has two live cards, and the player is hoping to make a pair on the flop while their opponent misses on the flop. This play can be quite profitable, because a lot of online players holding A K become committed to the pot and will often go all-in after the flop, even if they don't make a pair. At the end of the day, A K is still just two unpaired cards, and a lot of players get busted committing themselves to the hand. But this entry isn't about A K.
The flop gave a Player B a pair, which might give him the lead if Player C re-raised with A K or a smaller pair. Player B decides to see where he stands and bets 2,000. Player C just calls with a set of Jacks. The call by Player C disguises the strength of his hand, and may have given Player B the impression Player C was playing a flush draw. There is an argument for Player C to raise on the flop due to the presence of straight and flush possibilities. But those possibilities are unlikely, and a raise might scare away hands like what Player B is holding.
The turn gives Player B a inside straight draw to go with his pair. Player B bets 4,000 chips. Player C decides to go all-in at this point. Here, I think going all-in is the right play. Player B had already committed almost half his chips to the pot, and its going to be hard for Player B to get away from the hand unless he has been bluffing the whole time. Player C is also making Player B pay to draw if he has been playing with 2 clubs or something like K 10. It is probably correct for Player B to call the all-in. Player C is unlikely to be holding three of a kind (although this time he is), so Player B may believe his outs include the remaining Jacks, Tens, and the Nines. Player B still has a rebuy option to boot. Unfortunately for Player B, his only outs are the four remaining Nines.
Even if Player C only calls the bet on the turn, all the chips would have gone in on the river, where Player B makes two pair.
Playing hands like J 10 take a lot of discipline and skill. Even if you pair your Jack on the flop, there are a number of hands that have you beat, including higher pairs and Jacks with better kickers. Raising with hands like J 10 may be appropriate, but you have to be able to let the hand go if you meet resistance of if your straight potential is low. Alternatively, these hands can pay off well when you do make your straight. For some players, J 10 is their "favorite hand," and I admit I like to play the hand as well - just not from early position.
What's your favorite hand or hands? Sound off in the comments section, and thanks for reading.
Blinds are 100/200, and its still early in this tournament. I have already devoted a lot of space in prior entries discussing how the rebuy option affects play and strategy, so I won't further belabor the point, other than to say all the players involved in this hand still had the option to rebuy. Each player has close to their starting stack of 16,000 chips.
Player A folds. Player B raises to 600. Player C raises to 1,600. Player D folds, Player E calls. Play folds around to Player B, who calls the extra 1,000 chips. The pot is 5,100.
The flop is Q J 4, with 2 clubs. Player B bets 2,000, Player C calls, and Player E folds. The pot is now 9,100.
The turn is the 8 of diamonds. Player B bets 4,000. Player C goes all-in for another 7,000 chips. Player B calls and just has Player C covered. The pot is 31,100 chips. Player B shows J 10, with no flush possibility. Player C shows pocket Jacks. Player B needs only a 9 to make a straight and win the pot.
The river is a 10. Player C's trip Jacks beats Player B's two pair, and Player C wins the pot.
My thoughts on the hand:
Player B makes a raise from early position with J 10. This is a pretty marginal hand to play from early position. You are only going to be called by hands that are beating you. Or worse, you might get a re-raise and then be forced to either dump the hand or commit more chips to the pot with a losing hand. In this case, Player B saw a re-raise and a call of the raise. Nevertheless, Player B calls with likely the third best hand.
A lot of players like to play with J 10. The player hopes to flop a straight or a draw to a straight with high cards on the board that pair their opponent's holdings. You see this type of play online quite often. Players will call a pre-flop raise with J 10, hoping their opponent is playing A K or something similar. The player has two live cards, and the player is hoping to make a pair on the flop while their opponent misses on the flop. This play can be quite profitable, because a lot of online players holding A K become committed to the pot and will often go all-in after the flop, even if they don't make a pair. At the end of the day, A K is still just two unpaired cards, and a lot of players get busted committing themselves to the hand. But this entry isn't about A K.
The flop gave a Player B a pair, which might give him the lead if Player C re-raised with A K or a smaller pair. Player B decides to see where he stands and bets 2,000. Player C just calls with a set of Jacks. The call by Player C disguises the strength of his hand, and may have given Player B the impression Player C was playing a flush draw. There is an argument for Player C to raise on the flop due to the presence of straight and flush possibilities. But those possibilities are unlikely, and a raise might scare away hands like what Player B is holding.
The turn gives Player B a inside straight draw to go with his pair. Player B bets 4,000 chips. Player C decides to go all-in at this point. Here, I think going all-in is the right play. Player B had already committed almost half his chips to the pot, and its going to be hard for Player B to get away from the hand unless he has been bluffing the whole time. Player C is also making Player B pay to draw if he has been playing with 2 clubs or something like K 10. It is probably correct for Player B to call the all-in. Player C is unlikely to be holding three of a kind (although this time he is), so Player B may believe his outs include the remaining Jacks, Tens, and the Nines. Player B still has a rebuy option to boot. Unfortunately for Player B, his only outs are the four remaining Nines.
Even if Player C only calls the bet on the turn, all the chips would have gone in on the river, where Player B makes two pair.
Playing hands like J 10 take a lot of discipline and skill. Even if you pair your Jack on the flop, there are a number of hands that have you beat, including higher pairs and Jacks with better kickers. Raising with hands like J 10 may be appropriate, but you have to be able to let the hand go if you meet resistance of if your straight potential is low. Alternatively, these hands can pay off well when you do make your straight. For some players, J 10 is their "favorite hand," and I admit I like to play the hand as well - just not from early position.
What's your favorite hand or hands? Sound off in the comments section, and thanks for reading.
Wednesday, March 23, 2011
Hand No. 11
This hand occurred at a live game recently. Initially I didn't think this hand was worth much discussion, but several people at the table suggested I should write about it. I've come to realize there are some interesting nuances to this hand. Sometimes we just write off hands as "that's poker." But in this case, unorthodox play and a little bad luck resulted in disaster for a particular player.
Eight players at a table where each player started with 20,000 chips. This hand was the 3rd or 4th hand of the tournament. Blinds are 100/200. Player A barely has Player C covered, but both players still have about 20,000 in chips.
Player A raises to 600. B folds. Player C re-raises to 1,300. All other players fold around to Player A, who calls the additional 700. The pot is 2,900.
The Flop is A 10 A. Player A checks, and Player C bets 2,200. Player A calls. The pot is now 7,300 chips.
The Turn is a 3. Player A checks and Player C checks behind.
The River is a 4. Player A now bets 3,500. Player C goes all-in. Player A calls. Pot is over 40,000 chips. Player A shows A 4. Player C shows A 10. Player C's full house beats Player A's full house, and Player C wins the pot.
My thoughts on the hand:
Player A's raise pre-flop may have been an attempt to thin the players in the hand. I don't like to play these types of hands, because if you pair your Ace on the flop, you then have to wonder whether you are ahead in the hand, or being outkicked by a better Ace. The 4 kicker is only going to beat a 2 or a 3 kicker, and most times won't end up being played at a the end of the hand. Your best hope to to flop two-pair, and then your going to take a bunch of chips from someone with an Ace and a strong kicker.
Player C's re-raise was also a little unsuspected. A 10 probably isn't strong enough to raise with from an early position, unless you are committed to dumping the hand if you get a big re-raise before the flop. The 10 kicker is a better than the 4 kicker, but again will be losing to most of the hands that would likely call the raise. Player A did have the pot odds to call the re-raise, though. In the end, Player C's re-raise here may have helped convince Player A he was facing a hand like A K or A Q, rah ten than A 10.
The flop was very good for both players. Player A was still losing to a hand like A K, but the presence of two aces on the board made it less likely Player C was holding the last Ace in the deck. Player A's check helped to keep the pot size manageable, and Player A's call of the 2,200 was probably correct.
The play on the turn is probably what doomed Player A in this hand. Player A checks and Player C shrewdly checks behind him. Player A would now have reason he is facing a hand like A K, or a pocket pair below the aces. This is a move you see a lot with online play. A player bets big on the flop, then checks the turn to create the impression they were just bluffing. Their opponent then makes a big bet on the flop, which works great for the online player who often made a huge hand on the flop. The alternative would be to go ahead and bet on the turn. If your opponent had any kind of hand, you will have better chances get all their chips into the pot one step at a time, rather than making a big all-in bet on the river.
The river was terrible for Player A. Player A has now made a full house. He is beating a hand like A K or even pocket 10s. After the hand, Player A mentioned Player C was holding the only hand that could beat him. Since that's the case, it probably doesn't matter how the betting took place, as both players would eventually go all-in. Still, Player A leads out for 3,500 and then Player C goes all-in for about 16,000 chips. Player C is holding the stone cold nuts, and rather than simply re-raise an amount likely to get called, say 8,000, Player C bets all-in. Of course Player A calls. Player A stated had he not caught his 4 on the river, he probably folds to the all-in bet.
So how do we account for Player C's bet on the river? The all-in is only going to be called by hands as strong as a full house, or perhaps a very strong Ace. But the betting pre-flop and throughout the hand didn't really support a hand like A K. Player C didn't talk much after the hand, so we don't know what he was thinking about Player A's hand.
The tragedy which befell Player A demonstrates the risks and possible rewards of playing so-called marginal hands like Ace with a weak kicker. Had Player A been playing against an A K, then he wins all the chips at the end of the hand. As it turns out, Player A was behind throughout the hand. Unfortunately, Player A's hand only improved as the hand progressed. Player C's betting perfectly disguised the strength of his hand. Again, the chips were probably getting all-in no matter what. There probably was no way out for Player A in this hand, other then not playing the hand in the first place. It would be easy to say "that's just poker," but there's obviously more to it than that. An astute player would take note of the interesting plays made by each player, and remember them for next time.
As always, thanks for reading, and feel free to leave your thoughts in the comments section.
Eight players at a table where each player started with 20,000 chips. This hand was the 3rd or 4th hand of the tournament. Blinds are 100/200. Player A barely has Player C covered, but both players still have about 20,000 in chips.
Player A raises to 600. B folds. Player C re-raises to 1,300. All other players fold around to Player A, who calls the additional 700. The pot is 2,900.
The Flop is A 10 A. Player A checks, and Player C bets 2,200. Player A calls. The pot is now 7,300 chips.
The Turn is a 3. Player A checks and Player C checks behind.
The River is a 4. Player A now bets 3,500. Player C goes all-in. Player A calls. Pot is over 40,000 chips. Player A shows A 4. Player C shows A 10. Player C's full house beats Player A's full house, and Player C wins the pot.
My thoughts on the hand:
Player A's raise pre-flop may have been an attempt to thin the players in the hand. I don't like to play these types of hands, because if you pair your Ace on the flop, you then have to wonder whether you are ahead in the hand, or being outkicked by a better Ace. The 4 kicker is only going to beat a 2 or a 3 kicker, and most times won't end up being played at a the end of the hand. Your best hope to to flop two-pair, and then your going to take a bunch of chips from someone with an Ace and a strong kicker.
Player C's re-raise was also a little unsuspected. A 10 probably isn't strong enough to raise with from an early position, unless you are committed to dumping the hand if you get a big re-raise before the flop. The 10 kicker is a better than the 4 kicker, but again will be losing to most of the hands that would likely call the raise. Player A did have the pot odds to call the re-raise, though. In the end, Player C's re-raise here may have helped convince Player A he was facing a hand like A K or A Q, rah ten than A 10.
The flop was very good for both players. Player A was still losing to a hand like A K, but the presence of two aces on the board made it less likely Player C was holding the last Ace in the deck. Player A's check helped to keep the pot size manageable, and Player A's call of the 2,200 was probably correct.
The play on the turn is probably what doomed Player A in this hand. Player A checks and Player C shrewdly checks behind him. Player A would now have reason he is facing a hand like A K, or a pocket pair below the aces. This is a move you see a lot with online play. A player bets big on the flop, then checks the turn to create the impression they were just bluffing. Their opponent then makes a big bet on the flop, which works great for the online player who often made a huge hand on the flop. The alternative would be to go ahead and bet on the turn. If your opponent had any kind of hand, you will have better chances get all their chips into the pot one step at a time, rather than making a big all-in bet on the river.
The river was terrible for Player A. Player A has now made a full house. He is beating a hand like A K or even pocket 10s. After the hand, Player A mentioned Player C was holding the only hand that could beat him. Since that's the case, it probably doesn't matter how the betting took place, as both players would eventually go all-in. Still, Player A leads out for 3,500 and then Player C goes all-in for about 16,000 chips. Player C is holding the stone cold nuts, and rather than simply re-raise an amount likely to get called, say 8,000, Player C bets all-in. Of course Player A calls. Player A stated had he not caught his 4 on the river, he probably folds to the all-in bet.
So how do we account for Player C's bet on the river? The all-in is only going to be called by hands as strong as a full house, or perhaps a very strong Ace. But the betting pre-flop and throughout the hand didn't really support a hand like A K. Player C didn't talk much after the hand, so we don't know what he was thinking about Player A's hand.
The tragedy which befell Player A demonstrates the risks and possible rewards of playing so-called marginal hands like Ace with a weak kicker. Had Player A been playing against an A K, then he wins all the chips at the end of the hand. As it turns out, Player A was behind throughout the hand. Unfortunately, Player A's hand only improved as the hand progressed. Player C's betting perfectly disguised the strength of his hand. Again, the chips were probably getting all-in no matter what. There probably was no way out for Player A in this hand, other then not playing the hand in the first place. It would be easy to say "that's just poker," but there's obviously more to it than that. An astute player would take note of the interesting plays made by each player, and remember them for next time.
As always, thanks for reading, and feel free to leave your thoughts in the comments section.
Wednesday, March 16, 2011
Hand No. 10
This hand was interesting because it reflects some of the issues I've been discussing in recent entries.
There are 6 people in this tournament, we were short-handed at my home game this week. The blinds are 300/600. There are a couple of large stacks at the table, but most everyone is at a comfortable chip level. Player C and the Dealer have around 12,500 chips. Player C had just recently used a rebuy. I am Player C in this hand.
Player A and Player B fold. Player C raised to 1,600. The Dealer raises to 3,200. The SB and BB fold. Player C calls the additional 1,600. The pot is 7,300.
The flop is J 5 J, with two spades. Player C is first to act and bets 3,000. The Dealer quickly calls. The pot is now 13,300.
The turn is the Ace of spades. Player C checks and the Dealer pushes all-in for about 6,000. After much contemplation, Player C calls. Player C had the Dealer covered by 100 chips. Player C shows J 3, both clubs. The Dealer shows K Q, with no spades.
The river is a red 6. Player C wins a pot of approximately 25,000 with a set of Jacks.
My thoughts on the hand:
We'll start with the pre-flop raise made by Player C. This was an attempt on my part to simply steal the blinds with an otherwise unplayable hand. There are a number of factors to consider when making this type of move. You should be aware of the number of players remaining in the hand, as well as the playing tendencies of those remaining. Are they solid players, or are they players who will call a raise with a marginal hand? You also need to be able to let the hand go if you encounter serious resistance in the form of a big re-raise. You have to occasionally make this type of move to keep your opponents off-balance. If you only raise with premium hands, then you are less likely to get action from your opponents.
In this case, two players had folded ahead of me, and I figured a raise might work to collect the blinds, which at this point is not an inconsequential amount. I also have a hand I would happily dump if someone made a big re-raise. The Dealer did raise, but only raised just above the minimum. This raise may not have been designed to get me to fold, but instead reveal how strongly I felt about my hand. Since I simply called rather than put in another raise, I revealed that my hand may not be all that strong. Nevertheless, when the action came back to me it cost me 1,600 to see a flop on a potential pot of 7,300. At this point I decided to call and proceed with caution.
The flop was great for my hand. The presence of two Jacks on the board and one in my hand made it very unlikely the Dealer has a Jack as well. At this point I feel pretty good about my hand. I bet 3,000 on the flop for two reasons: 1) the presence of two spades on the board, and 2) I felt if my opponent hand an over-pair to the board, he would probably re-raise and I would be able to get all my chips into the pot with the best hand. The Dealer elected to call, which made me consider whether he had a spade draw or possibly a pocket pair lower than the Jacks.
The turn was the Ace of spades, and I made a mistake by checking rather than betting out again. I'll get to that later, but the Dealer pushing all-in was a great bet because it made me seriously consider whether he did have two spades in his hand. The bet was especially creative, because the Dealer correctly figured I would be reluctant to risk all my chips after just recently using a rebuy. If I lost this hand, I would be finished for the tournament.
I took a lot of time to consider my call. This first thing to do was to reconstruct the hand and try to figure a range of hands that the Dealer might be holding based on the betting in the hand. The Dealer made a re-raise on the flop. Again, I think this was a test raise to see how serious I was about my hand. At the time of the raise, I figured to dealer had two big cards like A K or A Q, or a high pair. The Dealer's call of my bet on the turn was suspicious - if the Dealer was holding a high pair, he may have raised again on the flop. His call suggested a drawing hand, and the only drawing hand was the spade flush draw. His all-in on the turn made sense if the Dealer was holding A K, as he may believe he now had the best hand, and wanted to discourage my potential draw to a flush. If the Dealer was trying to represent the flush on the turn, then that would have meant he made the pre-flop re-raise with something like K x or Q x of spades. In the end, that didn't make as much sense to me, and I decided the Dealer was most likely holding A K and was hoping his pair of Aces was now in the lead.
At this point, I still wasn't ready to make the call. I then had to consider the pot odds. If I truly believed the Dealer had a flush, did I have the pot odds to make a call, knowing I had potentially seven outs on the river (3 Aces, 3 Fives, 1 Jack)? The bet was 6,000 and the pot would be 25,000+ with my call. I'm not sure the pot odds were in my favor. Alternatively, I did have a big hand, and an opportunity to win a big pot. Reconstructing the hand, along with the size of the pot, ultimately led me to call the bet. It turns out the Dealer needed a 10 on the river to win the pot, and I was able to avoid disaster.
Back to my mistake on the turn. Rather than maintain control of the hand by betting out again, I opted to check to see what the Dealer would do. The Dealer's all-in bet forced me to make a tough decision for almost all of my chips. If I had bet out again, I would have been compelled to call any raise as I would have been committed to the pot. Sometimes, you can make your decisions easier by betting. By betting, I would have been creating mush better pot odds for my eventual call.
Obviously, there is an argument that my original raise pre-flop was a mistake. You can get into real trouble playing marginal hands when you catch a piece of the flop. Usually you end up committed to a pot where you have kicker problems. In this case though, the flop hit my hand so hard I had to continue on with the hand.
The Dealer's play in this hand demonstrates how you can use the board to win a pot even when you don't have a hand. The Dealer attempted to use the presence of a flush possibility to bet me off of my hand. This play works best against knowledgeable opponents. You can only make this play against someone who can recognize the hand you are representing, and will be willing to give you credit for holding the cards needed to make the hand. But even if the Dealer's play didn't work, he still had outs going to the river.
Hands like these can be pivotal in a tournament. Had I elected to give the Dealer credit for a big hand and folded, I would have been left with about 6,000 chips. With the blinds at 300/600, I only would have enough chips for about 7 rotations around the table. Instead, I was able to double up and was in a comfortable position moving forward. As always, feel free to leave your thoughts in the comments section. Thanks for reading.
There are 6 people in this tournament, we were short-handed at my home game this week. The blinds are 300/600. There are a couple of large stacks at the table, but most everyone is at a comfortable chip level. Player C and the Dealer have around 12,500 chips. Player C had just recently used a rebuy. I am Player C in this hand.
Player A and Player B fold. Player C raised to 1,600. The Dealer raises to 3,200. The SB and BB fold. Player C calls the additional 1,600. The pot is 7,300.
The flop is J 5 J, with two spades. Player C is first to act and bets 3,000. The Dealer quickly calls. The pot is now 13,300.
The turn is the Ace of spades. Player C checks and the Dealer pushes all-in for about 6,000. After much contemplation, Player C calls. Player C had the Dealer covered by 100 chips. Player C shows J 3, both clubs. The Dealer shows K Q, with no spades.
The river is a red 6. Player C wins a pot of approximately 25,000 with a set of Jacks.
My thoughts on the hand:
We'll start with the pre-flop raise made by Player C. This was an attempt on my part to simply steal the blinds with an otherwise unplayable hand. There are a number of factors to consider when making this type of move. You should be aware of the number of players remaining in the hand, as well as the playing tendencies of those remaining. Are they solid players, or are they players who will call a raise with a marginal hand? You also need to be able to let the hand go if you encounter serious resistance in the form of a big re-raise. You have to occasionally make this type of move to keep your opponents off-balance. If you only raise with premium hands, then you are less likely to get action from your opponents.
In this case, two players had folded ahead of me, and I figured a raise might work to collect the blinds, which at this point is not an inconsequential amount. I also have a hand I would happily dump if someone made a big re-raise. The Dealer did raise, but only raised just above the minimum. This raise may not have been designed to get me to fold, but instead reveal how strongly I felt about my hand. Since I simply called rather than put in another raise, I revealed that my hand may not be all that strong. Nevertheless, when the action came back to me it cost me 1,600 to see a flop on a potential pot of 7,300. At this point I decided to call and proceed with caution.
The flop was great for my hand. The presence of two Jacks on the board and one in my hand made it very unlikely the Dealer has a Jack as well. At this point I feel pretty good about my hand. I bet 3,000 on the flop for two reasons: 1) the presence of two spades on the board, and 2) I felt if my opponent hand an over-pair to the board, he would probably re-raise and I would be able to get all my chips into the pot with the best hand. The Dealer elected to call, which made me consider whether he had a spade draw or possibly a pocket pair lower than the Jacks.
The turn was the Ace of spades, and I made a mistake by checking rather than betting out again. I'll get to that later, but the Dealer pushing all-in was a great bet because it made me seriously consider whether he did have two spades in his hand. The bet was especially creative, because the Dealer correctly figured I would be reluctant to risk all my chips after just recently using a rebuy. If I lost this hand, I would be finished for the tournament.
I took a lot of time to consider my call. This first thing to do was to reconstruct the hand and try to figure a range of hands that the Dealer might be holding based on the betting in the hand. The Dealer made a re-raise on the flop. Again, I think this was a test raise to see how serious I was about my hand. At the time of the raise, I figured to dealer had two big cards like A K or A Q, or a high pair. The Dealer's call of my bet on the turn was suspicious - if the Dealer was holding a high pair, he may have raised again on the flop. His call suggested a drawing hand, and the only drawing hand was the spade flush draw. His all-in on the turn made sense if the Dealer was holding A K, as he may believe he now had the best hand, and wanted to discourage my potential draw to a flush. If the Dealer was trying to represent the flush on the turn, then that would have meant he made the pre-flop re-raise with something like K x or Q x of spades. In the end, that didn't make as much sense to me, and I decided the Dealer was most likely holding A K and was hoping his pair of Aces was now in the lead.
At this point, I still wasn't ready to make the call. I then had to consider the pot odds. If I truly believed the Dealer had a flush, did I have the pot odds to make a call, knowing I had potentially seven outs on the river (3 Aces, 3 Fives, 1 Jack)? The bet was 6,000 and the pot would be 25,000+ with my call. I'm not sure the pot odds were in my favor. Alternatively, I did have a big hand, and an opportunity to win a big pot. Reconstructing the hand, along with the size of the pot, ultimately led me to call the bet. It turns out the Dealer needed a 10 on the river to win the pot, and I was able to avoid disaster.
Back to my mistake on the turn. Rather than maintain control of the hand by betting out again, I opted to check to see what the Dealer would do. The Dealer's all-in bet forced me to make a tough decision for almost all of my chips. If I had bet out again, I would have been compelled to call any raise as I would have been committed to the pot. Sometimes, you can make your decisions easier by betting. By betting, I would have been creating mush better pot odds for my eventual call.
Obviously, there is an argument that my original raise pre-flop was a mistake. You can get into real trouble playing marginal hands when you catch a piece of the flop. Usually you end up committed to a pot where you have kicker problems. In this case though, the flop hit my hand so hard I had to continue on with the hand.
The Dealer's play in this hand demonstrates how you can use the board to win a pot even when you don't have a hand. The Dealer attempted to use the presence of a flush possibility to bet me off of my hand. This play works best against knowledgeable opponents. You can only make this play against someone who can recognize the hand you are representing, and will be willing to give you credit for holding the cards needed to make the hand. But even if the Dealer's play didn't work, he still had outs going to the river.
Hands like these can be pivotal in a tournament. Had I elected to give the Dealer credit for a big hand and folded, I would have been left with about 6,000 chips. With the blinds at 300/600, I only would have enough chips for about 7 rotations around the table. Instead, I was able to double up and was in a comfortable position moving forward. As always, feel free to leave your thoughts in the comments section. Thanks for reading.
Sunday, March 13, 2011
Rebuys
In the prior entry, I mentioned how the option to rebuy may have influenced the way a hand was played. I have decided to dedicate an entry to rebuys and how this option can affect your strategy during a tournament.
There are typically two types of rebuy options offered on tournaments. The first is unlimited rebuys until the end of a certain round of the tournament. The second is one rebuy until the end of a certain round in the tournament. A rebuy allows you to purchase an additional starting stack for the cost of the buy-in.
The first rebuy option is usually seen with an online multi-table tournament. You are typically offered unlimited rebuys until the end of one hour of play. Some of these tournaments will allow you to rebuy after your stack falls below the original starting stack, while other tournaments may require to bust out completely before you can rebuy. Often you are even offered the option to add-on during the first break. The add-on allows you to purchase a certain amount of chips for the additional cost of a buy-in. This structure allows for a significant prize pool while keeping the buy-in amounts low.
These tournaments usually have multiple players pushing all-in early and often, regardless of the strength of their holdings. The idea is to try to double up multiple times to build up a huge chip stack to play with. If you go all-in and lose, just rebuy and try again. It is very much like playing the lottery.
The problem this structure poses for a "solid" player is two-fold. First, you cannot just sit back and wait for the first hour to go by. You will be a small stack up against a lot of very big stacks. Second, even if you call an all-in with big cards, you are usually only 60% - 70% chance to win. Over the course of an hour, you are bound to lose some of these confrontations. You will be forced to rebuy and start back at your original starting stack, or just give up on the tournament.
Perhaps the best strategy is to think of these tournaments as having a buy-in of 4 to 5 times the actual buy-in. If the buy-in is $5, just imagine the buy-in is actually $20 - $30, and play accordingly. In order to remain competitive past the first hour, you will have to accumulate a lot of chips without the luxury of waiting for premium hands.
The other rebuy option you typically see in "live" games. You are offered one rebuy opportunity until the end of a certain round of play. For example, my weekly home game offers one rebuy up until the end of the 3rd round. You must lose all your chips in order to rebuy. The principle is the rebuy option allows players to survive a bad beat or two and stay alive in the tournament.
I used to think the rebuy just encouraged reckless play. I now think the rebuy option introduces some interesting strategy implications into the game, for both short stacks and big stacks. As a player's chip stack dwindles, particularly towards the end of the third round, they are faced with a choice. Do they just keep fighting and try to rebuild their stack? Or do they just push all-in hoping for a double up? Even if they lose, they can just rebuy for an original chip stack of 16,000, with the blinds are still manageable. Players in this situation should be willing to push with any two cards. Players with moderate or big chip stacks should recognize this, and their calling requirements can be loosened considerably.
As you are playing in the first 3 rounds, you need to be cognizant that the rebuy option will allow players to play drawing hands aggressively. If you are in a big hand, and suspect your opponent is drawing, you may consider betting your hand faster. Your opponent will be more likely to pay for the privilege of chasing their draws. Likewise, you are more likely to be called down with middle pairs, so again, you can bet your hand more aggressively.
I still believe the rebuy option is an overall detriment to game play. Players have a safety net, making them more willing to chase draws, call down with marginal hands, or attempt big bluffs. But consider this, if a player loses a 1/3 of his stack chasing a marginal hand, they then have less ammo to play a strong hand. If you pick up a hand, you have 10,000 in chips and double up to 20,000. If you make a conservative decision not to chase a marginal hand, you instead have 15,000 and can double up to 30,000. Now you are in a significantly better position. Of course, this is the case against playing marginal hands, irrespective of a rebuy option.
How does a rebuy affect your strategy? Feel free to share in the comments section, and thanks for reading.
There are typically two types of rebuy options offered on tournaments. The first is unlimited rebuys until the end of a certain round of the tournament. The second is one rebuy until the end of a certain round in the tournament. A rebuy allows you to purchase an additional starting stack for the cost of the buy-in.
The first rebuy option is usually seen with an online multi-table tournament. You are typically offered unlimited rebuys until the end of one hour of play. Some of these tournaments will allow you to rebuy after your stack falls below the original starting stack, while other tournaments may require to bust out completely before you can rebuy. Often you are even offered the option to add-on during the first break. The add-on allows you to purchase a certain amount of chips for the additional cost of a buy-in. This structure allows for a significant prize pool while keeping the buy-in amounts low.
These tournaments usually have multiple players pushing all-in early and often, regardless of the strength of their holdings. The idea is to try to double up multiple times to build up a huge chip stack to play with. If you go all-in and lose, just rebuy and try again. It is very much like playing the lottery.
The problem this structure poses for a "solid" player is two-fold. First, you cannot just sit back and wait for the first hour to go by. You will be a small stack up against a lot of very big stacks. Second, even if you call an all-in with big cards, you are usually only 60% - 70% chance to win. Over the course of an hour, you are bound to lose some of these confrontations. You will be forced to rebuy and start back at your original starting stack, or just give up on the tournament.
Perhaps the best strategy is to think of these tournaments as having a buy-in of 4 to 5 times the actual buy-in. If the buy-in is $5, just imagine the buy-in is actually $20 - $30, and play accordingly. In order to remain competitive past the first hour, you will have to accumulate a lot of chips without the luxury of waiting for premium hands.
The other rebuy option you typically see in "live" games. You are offered one rebuy opportunity until the end of a certain round of play. For example, my weekly home game offers one rebuy up until the end of the 3rd round. You must lose all your chips in order to rebuy. The principle is the rebuy option allows players to survive a bad beat or two and stay alive in the tournament.
I used to think the rebuy just encouraged reckless play. I now think the rebuy option introduces some interesting strategy implications into the game, for both short stacks and big stacks. As a player's chip stack dwindles, particularly towards the end of the third round, they are faced with a choice. Do they just keep fighting and try to rebuild their stack? Or do they just push all-in hoping for a double up? Even if they lose, they can just rebuy for an original chip stack of 16,000, with the blinds are still manageable. Players in this situation should be willing to push with any two cards. Players with moderate or big chip stacks should recognize this, and their calling requirements can be loosened considerably.
As you are playing in the first 3 rounds, you need to be cognizant that the rebuy option will allow players to play drawing hands aggressively. If you are in a big hand, and suspect your opponent is drawing, you may consider betting your hand faster. Your opponent will be more likely to pay for the privilege of chasing their draws. Likewise, you are more likely to be called down with middle pairs, so again, you can bet your hand more aggressively.
I still believe the rebuy option is an overall detriment to game play. Players have a safety net, making them more willing to chase draws, call down with marginal hands, or attempt big bluffs. But consider this, if a player loses a 1/3 of his stack chasing a marginal hand, they then have less ammo to play a strong hand. If you pick up a hand, you have 10,000 in chips and double up to 20,000. If you make a conservative decision not to chase a marginal hand, you instead have 15,000 and can double up to 30,000. Now you are in a significantly better position. Of course, this is the case against playing marginal hands, irrespective of a rebuy option.
How does a rebuy affect your strategy? Feel free to share in the comments section, and thanks for reading.
Saturday, March 12, 2011
Hand No. 9
Some hands will result in all-in confrontations no matter how they play out. However there are some interesting nuances to the following hand.
This hand occurred in the same tournament as Hand No. 8. Blinds are 200/400. Its still early in the tournament, but the Dealer and Player C have big stacks of approximately 30,000 chips. Player A calls for 400. Player C raises to 1,200, and Players D, E, & F all call for 1,200. The Dealer re-raises to 3,600. The SB calls for his final 2,700, but this does not cap the action. Player A folds, and Player C re-raises all in for about 30,000 chips. Players D, E, & F all fold. The Dealer calls for the remainder of his chips, also around 30,000 chips, but he is covered by Player C. The Dealer shows pocket Aces, the SB shows pocket 7s, and Player C shows pocket Kings. The pot is over 60,000.
The flop is K 10 8, with two spades. The turn is a 7 and the river is a 4. There are no flushes possible. Player C wins the pot with a set of Kings. The Dealer and SB are forced to rebuy or be knocked out of the tournament. This game allows one rebuy until the end of the 3rd round of play.
My thoughts on this hand:
Player C was immediately on my left in this tournament. Player C revealed after this hand that he "felt like" the Dealer would show pocket Aces after the initial re-raise. So should have Player C have trusted his instincts and laid down his pocket Kings? I have read a number of times about players who laid down pocket Kings when they just knew their opponent had to have pocket Aces. It depends on the circumstances, but I don't know if I could ever fold pocket Kings before the flop.
Player C did have other options when facing the re-raise from the Dealer. Player C could have just called and re-evaluated his hand after the flop. Its immaterial though, as all the chips would have gotten into the pot after the flop. Player C also could have re-raised before the flop - say to 10,000. But at this point he would have committed a 1/3 of his stack to a hand that would have been very difficult to get away from. Interestingly, if Player C had elected to let the hand go, the SB would have survived his all-in when he made a set of 7s on the turn.
As for the Dealer, I've expressed my opinion about playing pocket Aces before, so I won't belabor the point. The Dealer was facing 4 opponents who had already committed 1,200 to the pot. The Dealer needed to make a bigger re-raise to narrow the field a bit. Of course, in this instance luck wasn't on his side anyway. Player C wasn't going to fold to any bet.
The rebuy option probably influenced the play of this hand. Both Player C and the SB had the safety net of the rebuy. In the case of the SB, he was facing a raise, 3 callers, and a big re-raise. It was unlikely his pocket 7s were good at this point. But for his final 2,700 he had a shot at winning a pot approaching 10,000. And if he didn't get lucky, he could just rebuy to get another starting stack of 16,000. I'll probably dedicate a future entry to the rebuy concept. Rebuys and add-ons not only increase the prize pool, but they affect your strategy as the tournament progresses.
Sometimes I think the name of this blog should be "Aces Are No Good." We never remember when they hold up, only when they get crushed. Feel free to share your bad beat stories in the comments section, and thanks for reading.
This hand occurred in the same tournament as Hand No. 8. Blinds are 200/400. Its still early in the tournament, but the Dealer and Player C have big stacks of approximately 30,000 chips. Player A calls for 400. Player C raises to 1,200, and Players D, E, & F all call for 1,200. The Dealer re-raises to 3,600. The SB calls for his final 2,700, but this does not cap the action. Player A folds, and Player C re-raises all in for about 30,000 chips. Players D, E, & F all fold. The Dealer calls for the remainder of his chips, also around 30,000 chips, but he is covered by Player C. The Dealer shows pocket Aces, the SB shows pocket 7s, and Player C shows pocket Kings. The pot is over 60,000.
The flop is K 10 8, with two spades. The turn is a 7 and the river is a 4. There are no flushes possible. Player C wins the pot with a set of Kings. The Dealer and SB are forced to rebuy or be knocked out of the tournament. This game allows one rebuy until the end of the 3rd round of play.
My thoughts on this hand:
Player C was immediately on my left in this tournament. Player C revealed after this hand that he "felt like" the Dealer would show pocket Aces after the initial re-raise. So should have Player C have trusted his instincts and laid down his pocket Kings? I have read a number of times about players who laid down pocket Kings when they just knew their opponent had to have pocket Aces. It depends on the circumstances, but I don't know if I could ever fold pocket Kings before the flop.
Player C did have other options when facing the re-raise from the Dealer. Player C could have just called and re-evaluated his hand after the flop. Its immaterial though, as all the chips would have gotten into the pot after the flop. Player C also could have re-raised before the flop - say to 10,000. But at this point he would have committed a 1/3 of his stack to a hand that would have been very difficult to get away from. Interestingly, if Player C had elected to let the hand go, the SB would have survived his all-in when he made a set of 7s on the turn.
As for the Dealer, I've expressed my opinion about playing pocket Aces before, so I won't belabor the point. The Dealer was facing 4 opponents who had already committed 1,200 to the pot. The Dealer needed to make a bigger re-raise to narrow the field a bit. Of course, in this instance luck wasn't on his side anyway. Player C wasn't going to fold to any bet.
The rebuy option probably influenced the play of this hand. Both Player C and the SB had the safety net of the rebuy. In the case of the SB, he was facing a raise, 3 callers, and a big re-raise. It was unlikely his pocket 7s were good at this point. But for his final 2,700 he had a shot at winning a pot approaching 10,000. And if he didn't get lucky, he could just rebuy to get another starting stack of 16,000. I'll probably dedicate a future entry to the rebuy concept. Rebuys and add-ons not only increase the prize pool, but they affect your strategy as the tournament progresses.
Sometimes I think the name of this blog should be "Aces Are No Good." We never remember when they hold up, only when they get crushed. Feel free to share your bad beat stories in the comments section, and thanks for reading.
Hand No. 8
This entry will demonstrate why pot odds are such an important aspect of Texas Hold'em. Pot odds should be considered in every hand you play, rather than relying solely on the strength of the cards of your hand.
First hand of a live game tournament. Ten players at the table with starting stacks of 16,000 chips, and blinds start at 100/200. I am the player in the SB, and I have K 4 unsuited.
Player A folds. Players B & C call for 200. Player D folds. Players E, F, & G call for 200, as do the Dealer and the SB. The BB raises to 800. As the BB makes this raise, I unfortunately state his raise is unlikely to eliminate any of the players who limped. All players except the SB call for 800. The pot is 5,800.
The flop is K 9 4, with two clubs. The BB checks. Player B bets 800 and Player C calls. All other players fold around to the BB who calls for 800. The pot is now 8,200.
The turn is the Ace of diamonds. The BB now leads out with a bet of 1,500. Player B folds and Player C calls. The pot is now 11,200.
The river is the 7 of spades. The BB checks and Player C checks as well. The BB shows A 10 unsuited, Player C shows 8 9. The BB wins the pot of 11,200.
My thoughts on the hand:
Generally, if someone limps into the pot from early position, it creates a domino effect, with each successive limper creating better pot odds for the next player. By the time the action got around to the SB initially, he only needed to call 100 for a potential pot of 1,600. The initial call was correct, even with K 4 unsuited, and it would have been correct for any two cards.
The BB held A 10 unsuited and faced two choices. The BB could check and see a flop on a decent sized pot for no extra investment. But the BB would then have a positional disadvantage after the flop. Alternatively, the BB could raise, sensing that a number of the limpers had marginal hands. A raise would also help his positional disadvantage as well by causing any callers to be hesitant to bet after the flop. A 10 is also the type of hand that can get you into trouble, so a raise here would help better define the type of hands he is facing. But the BB only raises 800, which is not enough to drive out the other players, except for the SB. Player B not only had the express odds to call (600 for a pot of 2,800), but the implied odds made the call that much easier. Player B could infer that several of the players behind him would call, as each call would improve the pot odds for the next player.
Putting aside the strength of his hand, if the BB were inclined to raise pre-flop in this situation, a much stiffer raise would be needed to drive out some of the marginal hands - somewhere in the neighborhood of 150% to 200% of the pot. There is a slight risk one of the early players limped with a big pair, hoping for a re-raise. But a bigger raise would have given the BB a better idea of what he was facing.
So imagine the SB's dismay when the flop hit. The SB folded K 4, and the flop would have given him two pair, which it turns out would have been the best hand. So why did the SB fold to the raise before the flop? After the BB raised pre-flop, all the players already in the hand called. Therefore, it would cost the SB 600 to see a flop for a pot of 6,400. Those are pot odds of over 10 to 1. The SB need to call with any two cards at this point. And it turns out the minuscule odds would pay off for the SB. So what happened?
Several things were going through my mind. First, it was the first hand of the night. I wasn't quite "settled" and ready to play at this point. I simply failed to consider the pot odds. Calling the initial 100 was a "no-brainer", but the raise made me dump my worthless cards. Second, it was early, and I figured a K on the flop would only lose me more chips to a better K, and it was unlikely a 4 on the flop would help me. And finally, I was feeling a bit sheepish about my warning to the BB on the size of his bet. I generally try to discourage this type of "table talk", so I felt like I should get out of the hand to make up for my error.
Pot odds have to be a component of your poker game. Calculating pot odds can actually make your decisions easier. But you have to have the discipline to let the hand go if the flop doesn't connect with your cards or if you meet any real resistance. When you do connect, you have to make sure you get maximum value for your hand to off-set the times you pay to see the flop and don't connect.
Beneath the skill it takes to read your opponents or to pull off outrageous bluffs, poker is a gambling. To win a tournament you have to be willing to gamble, and pot odds help you to pick your spots so that your gambles will pay off in the long run.
Math is hard. Got any tips for calculating pot odds? Feel free to leave your thoughts in the comments section, and thanks for reading.
First hand of a live game tournament. Ten players at the table with starting stacks of 16,000 chips, and blinds start at 100/200. I am the player in the SB, and I have K 4 unsuited.
Player A folds. Players B & C call for 200. Player D folds. Players E, F, & G call for 200, as do the Dealer and the SB. The BB raises to 800. As the BB makes this raise, I unfortunately state his raise is unlikely to eliminate any of the players who limped. All players except the SB call for 800. The pot is 5,800.
The flop is K 9 4, with two clubs. The BB checks. Player B bets 800 and Player C calls. All other players fold around to the BB who calls for 800. The pot is now 8,200.
The turn is the Ace of diamonds. The BB now leads out with a bet of 1,500. Player B folds and Player C calls. The pot is now 11,200.
The river is the 7 of spades. The BB checks and Player C checks as well. The BB shows A 10 unsuited, Player C shows 8 9. The BB wins the pot of 11,200.
My thoughts on the hand:
Generally, if someone limps into the pot from early position, it creates a domino effect, with each successive limper creating better pot odds for the next player. By the time the action got around to the SB initially, he only needed to call 100 for a potential pot of 1,600. The initial call was correct, even with K 4 unsuited, and it would have been correct for any two cards.
The BB held A 10 unsuited and faced two choices. The BB could check and see a flop on a decent sized pot for no extra investment. But the BB would then have a positional disadvantage after the flop. Alternatively, the BB could raise, sensing that a number of the limpers had marginal hands. A raise would also help his positional disadvantage as well by causing any callers to be hesitant to bet after the flop. A 10 is also the type of hand that can get you into trouble, so a raise here would help better define the type of hands he is facing. But the BB only raises 800, which is not enough to drive out the other players, except for the SB. Player B not only had the express odds to call (600 for a pot of 2,800), but the implied odds made the call that much easier. Player B could infer that several of the players behind him would call, as each call would improve the pot odds for the next player.
Putting aside the strength of his hand, if the BB were inclined to raise pre-flop in this situation, a much stiffer raise would be needed to drive out some of the marginal hands - somewhere in the neighborhood of 150% to 200% of the pot. There is a slight risk one of the early players limped with a big pair, hoping for a re-raise. But a bigger raise would have given the BB a better idea of what he was facing.
So imagine the SB's dismay when the flop hit. The SB folded K 4, and the flop would have given him two pair, which it turns out would have been the best hand. So why did the SB fold to the raise before the flop? After the BB raised pre-flop, all the players already in the hand called. Therefore, it would cost the SB 600 to see a flop for a pot of 6,400. Those are pot odds of over 10 to 1. The SB need to call with any two cards at this point. And it turns out the minuscule odds would pay off for the SB. So what happened?
Several things were going through my mind. First, it was the first hand of the night. I wasn't quite "settled" and ready to play at this point. I simply failed to consider the pot odds. Calling the initial 100 was a "no-brainer", but the raise made me dump my worthless cards. Second, it was early, and I figured a K on the flop would only lose me more chips to a better K, and it was unlikely a 4 on the flop would help me. And finally, I was feeling a bit sheepish about my warning to the BB on the size of his bet. I generally try to discourage this type of "table talk", so I felt like I should get out of the hand to make up for my error.
Pot odds have to be a component of your poker game. Calculating pot odds can actually make your decisions easier. But you have to have the discipline to let the hand go if the flop doesn't connect with your cards or if you meet any real resistance. When you do connect, you have to make sure you get maximum value for your hand to off-set the times you pay to see the flop and don't connect.
Beneath the skill it takes to read your opponents or to pull off outrageous bluffs, poker is a gambling. To win a tournament you have to be willing to gamble, and pot odds help you to pick your spots so that your gambles will pay off in the long run.
Math is hard. Got any tips for calculating pot odds? Feel free to leave your thoughts in the comments section, and thanks for reading.
Thursday, February 24, 2011
Hand No. 7
I haven't encountered a terribly interesting hand in the past week, but in order to avoid too long a lay-off in my entries, I'll discuss a hand I encountered last night in a multi-table tourney. This hand reminded me a book I read written by a poker pro. The pro is notorious for keeping notes on hands played throughout a tournament. In his book, he revealed every hand he played during a major tournament he eventually won. That book is part of the inspiration for this blog. In all the hands he played over the two-day tournament, there were only 5 or 6 hands he considered crucial to winning the tournament.
Final table or a 5 table sit-n-go tournament. Its worth noting the buy-in for this tournament was $1, but the play at the final stages of the tournament seemed pretty straight-forward. Nine players remain of the 45 entrants. The top stacks remaining have stacks in the neighborhood of 10,000 to 12,000 chips. The three bottom stacks range from 1,500 to 3,300 chips. Seven players will receive a pay-out, with only about $13 going to first place and $1.70 going to seventh. The blinds are 300/600. Player A has 5,500 chips. Player E has 10,500 chips. I am Player E in this hand.
Player A is first to act, and he raises to 1,800 chips. All players fold to Player E, who calls for 1,800. All other players in the hand fold. The pot contains 4,500.
The flop is 8 6 2, all spades. Player A acts first again, and leads out for 1,800, which is more than half of his remaining stack. Player E raises Player A all-in for his remaining stack. Player A calls. The pot contains about 12,000 chips.
Player A shows Q Q, with the Queen of spades. Player E shows 9 9, with no spades. The turn and river are no help to Player E, and Player A wins the pot. Player A and Player E essentially flip chip stacks. I was left with about 5,000 chips after the hand. I managed to hang in long enough to finish 6th in this tournament, but was unable to recover from this hand.
My thoughts on the hand:
From the outset, I think I played this hand poorly, and got the outcome I deserved. There were a number of clues to suggest I was behind in this hand every step of the way. Player A had 5,500 chips at the start of the hand, putting him in the middle of the remaining players or about at chip average. However, the blinds were 300/600, so he could only survive six more rotations through the blinds. Rather than pushing all-in, he elected to only raise 3 times the big blind. So, even with a diminishing ship stack, he appeared to be looking for action. An all-in bet would have been more indicative of two unsuited, unpaired cards. But even if he had something like K 10, I was still no better than 50/50, and likely behind when I made the call pre-flop.
No matter what came on the flop, I anticipated he would go all-in. Instead, he bet 1,800 again, or about 1/3 of the pot. Again, Player A was practically begging for a call. Unfortunately, the flop was safe for my hand. But when raising Player A all-in, I was mostly hoping he had committed himself to the hand with A K or A Q.
The status of the tournament should have provided some extra insight. There were several short stacks, and Player A could have been content to wait a few more hands and hope some of the short stacks got knocked out - hoping to make the money. Player A instead chose to get active. Given his position at the table and his chip stack, this was another clue he had a strong hand.
My own position in the tournament argues for not playing the nines. I was third in chip position, and safely on my way to making the money, not to mention in position to potentially win the tourney. Instead, I ignored or dicounted the warning signs (perhaps because of the size of my stack) and ended up limping to the finish. If I was going to call an all-in, I would have preferred to go up against one of the smaller stacks, who likely would have been pushing with lesser holdings and posed a smaller threat to my chip stack. I risked over half of my stack on a hand where I was far less than 50% to win.
Pot odds cannot be ignored here. Pre-flop I was being offered a chance to win 4,500 for a risk of 1,800. That's suitable if I were simply facing a coin flip. After the flop, I was being offered a chance to win 6,300 for a risk of 1,800, great odds again. Too good to be true, it turns out. If I had a more sizable stack at the start of the hand, then playing this hand out is probably okay. But again, I couldn't put the pieces together fast enough. One moment of shaky thinking really cost me.
In the end, this was a crucial hand for my tournament life. I didn't watch the finish to see whether Player A was able to ride the momentum to a win, but I wish I did. You never know when these crucial moments will come up, which is why being able to pay attention and think clearly throughout the tournament is so important.
Got any tips for avioding these types of lapses in judgment? Sound off in the comments section, and thanks for reading.
Final table or a 5 table sit-n-go tournament. Its worth noting the buy-in for this tournament was $1, but the play at the final stages of the tournament seemed pretty straight-forward. Nine players remain of the 45 entrants. The top stacks remaining have stacks in the neighborhood of 10,000 to 12,000 chips. The three bottom stacks range from 1,500 to 3,300 chips. Seven players will receive a pay-out, with only about $13 going to first place and $1.70 going to seventh. The blinds are 300/600. Player A has 5,500 chips. Player E has 10,500 chips. I am Player E in this hand.
Player A is first to act, and he raises to 1,800 chips. All players fold to Player E, who calls for 1,800. All other players in the hand fold. The pot contains 4,500.
The flop is 8 6 2, all spades. Player A acts first again, and leads out for 1,800, which is more than half of his remaining stack. Player E raises Player A all-in for his remaining stack. Player A calls. The pot contains about 12,000 chips.
Player A shows Q Q, with the Queen of spades. Player E shows 9 9, with no spades. The turn and river are no help to Player E, and Player A wins the pot. Player A and Player E essentially flip chip stacks. I was left with about 5,000 chips after the hand. I managed to hang in long enough to finish 6th in this tournament, but was unable to recover from this hand.
My thoughts on the hand:
From the outset, I think I played this hand poorly, and got the outcome I deserved. There were a number of clues to suggest I was behind in this hand every step of the way. Player A had 5,500 chips at the start of the hand, putting him in the middle of the remaining players or about at chip average. However, the blinds were 300/600, so he could only survive six more rotations through the blinds. Rather than pushing all-in, he elected to only raise 3 times the big blind. So, even with a diminishing ship stack, he appeared to be looking for action. An all-in bet would have been more indicative of two unsuited, unpaired cards. But even if he had something like K 10, I was still no better than 50/50, and likely behind when I made the call pre-flop.
No matter what came on the flop, I anticipated he would go all-in. Instead, he bet 1,800 again, or about 1/3 of the pot. Again, Player A was practically begging for a call. Unfortunately, the flop was safe for my hand. But when raising Player A all-in, I was mostly hoping he had committed himself to the hand with A K or A Q.
The status of the tournament should have provided some extra insight. There were several short stacks, and Player A could have been content to wait a few more hands and hope some of the short stacks got knocked out - hoping to make the money. Player A instead chose to get active. Given his position at the table and his chip stack, this was another clue he had a strong hand.
My own position in the tournament argues for not playing the nines. I was third in chip position, and safely on my way to making the money, not to mention in position to potentially win the tourney. Instead, I ignored or dicounted the warning signs (perhaps because of the size of my stack) and ended up limping to the finish. If I was going to call an all-in, I would have preferred to go up against one of the smaller stacks, who likely would have been pushing with lesser holdings and posed a smaller threat to my chip stack. I risked over half of my stack on a hand where I was far less than 50% to win.
Pot odds cannot be ignored here. Pre-flop I was being offered a chance to win 4,500 for a risk of 1,800. That's suitable if I were simply facing a coin flip. After the flop, I was being offered a chance to win 6,300 for a risk of 1,800, great odds again. Too good to be true, it turns out. If I had a more sizable stack at the start of the hand, then playing this hand out is probably okay. But again, I couldn't put the pieces together fast enough. One moment of shaky thinking really cost me.
In the end, this was a crucial hand for my tournament life. I didn't watch the finish to see whether Player A was able to ride the momentum to a win, but I wish I did. You never know when these crucial moments will come up, which is why being able to pay attention and think clearly throughout the tournament is so important.
Got any tips for avioding these types of lapses in judgment? Sound off in the comments section, and thanks for reading.
Wednesday, February 16, 2011
Hand No. 6
The following hand provides an example of using good position and a dominant hand to maximize value for a hand.
Full table of ten players, blinds are 200/400. Player A raises to 800, Players C & D call, Player E raises to 2,000. The SB along with Players A, C, and D all call for 2,000. Pot is now 8,400.
The flop is K 9 2, with 2 spades on the board. The SB leads out for 4,000, and Player A calls. Players C & D fold. Player E goes all-in for his final 10,200. The SB calls, and is covered by Player E. After some hesitation, Player A folds.
SB shows K 10, no spades. Player E shows pocket Aces. Player A then reveals he folded K Q. I was Player B in this hand. I elected not play with Kd 9d, so I know the SB needs a 10 or running straight cards to come from behind and win the hand. Turn is an 8, and the river is an Ace, giving Player E a set of Aces. Player wins a pot of well over 30,000. SB is knocked out, but house rules allow one rebuy at this point, which may have also influenced the SB's play.
My thoughts on this hand:
I can imagine Player E was thrilled to see so much action ahead of him while holding pocket Aces. One player made a min-raise from early position and 2 players had already called. The questions for Player E is how much to raise? Player E chose to re-raise 2.5 times the prior bets, or 5 times the big blind. This bet should have been enough to drive out junk hands, but keep around the kind of hands that were shown down. The fact he got so many calls on his re-raise suggests Player E could have made a larger bet, but probably no more than 2,500-3,000.
Player E's bet was effective because it increased the value of the pot, and given he had position on everyone in the hand, he could evaluate the flop and how the table reacted. The SB leading out made sense, as he had top pair with a decent kicker. Player A just calling with top pair and a good kicker was interesting, but he did have three players acting behind him, including Player E who made the big re-raise pre-flop. Fortunately for Player A, his decision to just call gave him the option of dumping the hand when Player E re-raised again on the flop.
Player E was probably correct to re-raise all-in after the flop. There was plenty in the pot at that point, and he needed to protect his hand against the flush draw and the gut-shot straight draw. A straight call by Player E may have gotten another bet out of Player A on the turn, but again the risk of the flush draw argues against slow-playing at this point.
Player E chose an approach that built the pot, but may have also risked being out-drawn. Some may argue he needed a bigger raise pre-flop to eliminate some players. In fact, I have argued in prior entries Pocket Aces are better played against one or two players, rather than 3 or more. Here, Player E took advantage of his position to wade into deeper waters with his Aces, and he reaped a big reward for his risk.
So this is the first time in recorded history Pocket Aces held up, right? Use the comments section to let me know if you just fold Pocket Aces to save yourself the misery. And thanks for reading.
Full table of ten players, blinds are 200/400. Player A raises to 800, Players C & D call, Player E raises to 2,000. The SB along with Players A, C, and D all call for 2,000. Pot is now 8,400.
The flop is K 9 2, with 2 spades on the board. The SB leads out for 4,000, and Player A calls. Players C & D fold. Player E goes all-in for his final 10,200. The SB calls, and is covered by Player E. After some hesitation, Player A folds.
SB shows K 10, no spades. Player E shows pocket Aces. Player A then reveals he folded K Q. I was Player B in this hand. I elected not play with Kd 9d, so I know the SB needs a 10 or running straight cards to come from behind and win the hand. Turn is an 8, and the river is an Ace, giving Player E a set of Aces. Player wins a pot of well over 30,000. SB is knocked out, but house rules allow one rebuy at this point, which may have also influenced the SB's play.
My thoughts on this hand:
I can imagine Player E was thrilled to see so much action ahead of him while holding pocket Aces. One player made a min-raise from early position and 2 players had already called. The questions for Player E is how much to raise? Player E chose to re-raise 2.5 times the prior bets, or 5 times the big blind. This bet should have been enough to drive out junk hands, but keep around the kind of hands that were shown down. The fact he got so many calls on his re-raise suggests Player E could have made a larger bet, but probably no more than 2,500-3,000.
Player E's bet was effective because it increased the value of the pot, and given he had position on everyone in the hand, he could evaluate the flop and how the table reacted. The SB leading out made sense, as he had top pair with a decent kicker. Player A just calling with top pair and a good kicker was interesting, but he did have three players acting behind him, including Player E who made the big re-raise pre-flop. Fortunately for Player A, his decision to just call gave him the option of dumping the hand when Player E re-raised again on the flop.
Player E was probably correct to re-raise all-in after the flop. There was plenty in the pot at that point, and he needed to protect his hand against the flush draw and the gut-shot straight draw. A straight call by Player E may have gotten another bet out of Player A on the turn, but again the risk of the flush draw argues against slow-playing at this point.
Player E chose an approach that built the pot, but may have also risked being out-drawn. Some may argue he needed a bigger raise pre-flop to eliminate some players. In fact, I have argued in prior entries Pocket Aces are better played against one or two players, rather than 3 or more. Here, Player E took advantage of his position to wade into deeper waters with his Aces, and he reaped a big reward for his risk.
So this is the first time in recorded history Pocket Aces held up, right? Use the comments section to let me know if you just fold Pocket Aces to save yourself the misery. And thanks for reading.
Hand No. 5
I wasn't going to write about this hand at first, but the more I thought about it, I realized there is an interesting concept at play in this hand worth discussion. In this entry, we'll discuss what to do with a huge hand at a crucial moment in a tournament.
Four players remain out of ten entrants. Blinds are 1000/2000. The Dealer has a little over 50,000 chips, SB has 15,600, BB has approximately 60,000, and Player A has approximately 50,000. This tournament pays only two places, with a bulk of the payout going to first place. Player A is first to act.
Player A folds and the Dealer raises to 6,000. SB goes all-in for his final 15,600. BB re-raises all-in. After some thought, the Dealer calls. Dealer shows K K, SB shows A J unsuited, and BB shows A K unsuited.
The board comes 8 5 4 8 Q. No flush for the SB or BB. The Dealer takes down a total pot of close to 120,000. The BB is left with approximately 8,000 chips, or enough for about 4 big blinds. SB is knocked out of the tournament.
My thoughts on this hand:
The Dealer made a standard raise of 3 times the big blind. Although this may indicate some type of hand, it is difficult to confidently put the Dealer on a big pocket pair, due to his position and chip stack. SB's push all-in for his remaining 15,600 with A J makes sense as he is getting desperate and A J is a good hand with 4 players at the table. So what do we make of the play by the BB?
The BB had several options at this point, all of them defensible.
A) The BB chose to go all-in, risking a significant portion of his chip stack. This was an attempt at an isolation play. The BB had a strong enough hand to call SB's all-in bet. The BB wanted to compete only with the SB and made a re-raise to try to eliminate the Dealer from the hand. The BB may also have suspected the Dealer was making a move to steal the blinds based on the Dealer's position and chip stack. Finally, when considered in a vacuum, A K is a very strong hand. The only hands you don't want to see from your opponent is pocket Aces or pocket Kings. The likelihood of one opponent holding either of those hands is remote, even more so considering the BB had an Ace and a King in his hand.
B) The BB could have made a mid-size raise. House rules would have allowed the BB to re-raise the SB's all-in bet to as little as 25,200. A raise in the neighborhood of 30,000 would have given the BB a chance to see if the Dealer was serious about his hand, while leaving him with about 30,000 if he met resistance and suspected the Dealer did have a big pocket pair. Or perhaps the Dealer would have only called a mid-size raise and the BB would at least see a flop before making a big decision for the rest of his chips.
C) The BB could have called the SB's all-in bet of 15,600. Action would go back to the Dealer, who could fold, call, or re-raise. If the Dealer then went all-in, and the BB believed the story the Dealer was telling, the BB could get away from the hand and still have 45,000 in his stack. Another reason the Dealer may just call the all-in bet of 15,600 is to execute an unspoken cooperation play. The Dealer and the BB had an opportunity to eliminate a player from the tournament, and move one step close to finishing in the money. The Dealer may have felt, even with a premium hand, that two players have a better chance of eliminating the small stack. The Dealer may have called the SB's all-in, and then the Dealer and the BB could have checked down the hand hoping one of them would eliminate the SB. Or the Dealer may have bet out after a safe-looking flop and again the BB could have made a big decision with the benefit of more information. In the end, had the BB opted to just call the SB's all-in, he may have escaped the hand with 45,000 chips, 3 players remaining, and very much alive in the chase for the money.
D) The BB could have folded his hand pre-flop. This would be a very conservative play. However, if the BB felt the Dealer would call the SB's all-in bet, the BB could have just left it to the Dealer to try to knock out the SB. The factors lending to a call from the Dealer were very compelling. The Dealer would only need to put in another 9,600 to play for a pot that would be over 30,000. The Dealer had enough chips to commit to a pot with the SB. And the SB was very short-stacked with only about 8 big blinds left. The SB could be making this move with any two cards. Finally, the Dealer's raise could have just been a move to steal the blinds, or it could have been a bet for value. The BB may have been unsure what the Dealer was holding, and rather than risk his tournament with 2 unpaired cards, the BB may have decided to let the Dealer eliminate the SB. Bottom line, had the BB just folded, he had the potential of playing three-handed with approximately 60,000 chips.
This hand reminds me of a saying from basketball that used to drive me nuts. Announcers or pundits would often say that in the last minute of the game, referees should just "let the players play." Meaning the referees should be less willing to call a foul in the last minute of the game, so that the players on the court determine the outcome. I never agreed with that concept. I felt if a foul would be called in the early part of the game, then a foul should be called in the last minute. I worried the "let the players play" mentality was a benefit to the defense, who could be more physically aggressive in the final minute without the consequence of a foul.
So is it the same in poker? If the BB would have made a big re-raise with A K early in the tournament, shouldn't he behave the same way in the late stages? I don't know, and I suspect we all may feel differently. My preference would have been to call the SB's all-in, see what the Dealer does, and then hope to check the hand down if the board is unfavorable. How did things end for the BB? He hung in valiantly for a few hands, but was ultimately knocked out by the Dealer for a third place finish.
What do you think? Is it ever okay to just fold A K, even if you don't believe you opponent has one of the top two pairs? Sound off in the comments section, and thanks for reading.
Four players remain out of ten entrants. Blinds are 1000/2000. The Dealer has a little over 50,000 chips, SB has 15,600, BB has approximately 60,000, and Player A has approximately 50,000. This tournament pays only two places, with a bulk of the payout going to first place. Player A is first to act.
Player A folds and the Dealer raises to 6,000. SB goes all-in for his final 15,600. BB re-raises all-in. After some thought, the Dealer calls. Dealer shows K K, SB shows A J unsuited, and BB shows A K unsuited.
The board comes 8 5 4 8 Q. No flush for the SB or BB. The Dealer takes down a total pot of close to 120,000. The BB is left with approximately 8,000 chips, or enough for about 4 big blinds. SB is knocked out of the tournament.
My thoughts on this hand:
The Dealer made a standard raise of 3 times the big blind. Although this may indicate some type of hand, it is difficult to confidently put the Dealer on a big pocket pair, due to his position and chip stack. SB's push all-in for his remaining 15,600 with A J makes sense as he is getting desperate and A J is a good hand with 4 players at the table. So what do we make of the play by the BB?
The BB had several options at this point, all of them defensible.
A) The BB chose to go all-in, risking a significant portion of his chip stack. This was an attempt at an isolation play. The BB had a strong enough hand to call SB's all-in bet. The BB wanted to compete only with the SB and made a re-raise to try to eliminate the Dealer from the hand. The BB may also have suspected the Dealer was making a move to steal the blinds based on the Dealer's position and chip stack. Finally, when considered in a vacuum, A K is a very strong hand. The only hands you don't want to see from your opponent is pocket Aces or pocket Kings. The likelihood of one opponent holding either of those hands is remote, even more so considering the BB had an Ace and a King in his hand.
B) The BB could have made a mid-size raise. House rules would have allowed the BB to re-raise the SB's all-in bet to as little as 25,200. A raise in the neighborhood of 30,000 would have given the BB a chance to see if the Dealer was serious about his hand, while leaving him with about 30,000 if he met resistance and suspected the Dealer did have a big pocket pair. Or perhaps the Dealer would have only called a mid-size raise and the BB would at least see a flop before making a big decision for the rest of his chips.
C) The BB could have called the SB's all-in bet of 15,600. Action would go back to the Dealer, who could fold, call, or re-raise. If the Dealer then went all-in, and the BB believed the story the Dealer was telling, the BB could get away from the hand and still have 45,000 in his stack. Another reason the Dealer may just call the all-in bet of 15,600 is to execute an unspoken cooperation play. The Dealer and the BB had an opportunity to eliminate a player from the tournament, and move one step close to finishing in the money. The Dealer may have felt, even with a premium hand, that two players have a better chance of eliminating the small stack. The Dealer may have called the SB's all-in, and then the Dealer and the BB could have checked down the hand hoping one of them would eliminate the SB. Or the Dealer may have bet out after a safe-looking flop and again the BB could have made a big decision with the benefit of more information. In the end, had the BB opted to just call the SB's all-in, he may have escaped the hand with 45,000 chips, 3 players remaining, and very much alive in the chase for the money.
D) The BB could have folded his hand pre-flop. This would be a very conservative play. However, if the BB felt the Dealer would call the SB's all-in bet, the BB could have just left it to the Dealer to try to knock out the SB. The factors lending to a call from the Dealer were very compelling. The Dealer would only need to put in another 9,600 to play for a pot that would be over 30,000. The Dealer had enough chips to commit to a pot with the SB. And the SB was very short-stacked with only about 8 big blinds left. The SB could be making this move with any two cards. Finally, the Dealer's raise could have just been a move to steal the blinds, or it could have been a bet for value. The BB may have been unsure what the Dealer was holding, and rather than risk his tournament with 2 unpaired cards, the BB may have decided to let the Dealer eliminate the SB. Bottom line, had the BB just folded, he had the potential of playing three-handed with approximately 60,000 chips.
This hand reminds me of a saying from basketball that used to drive me nuts. Announcers or pundits would often say that in the last minute of the game, referees should just "let the players play." Meaning the referees should be less willing to call a foul in the last minute of the game, so that the players on the court determine the outcome. I never agreed with that concept. I felt if a foul would be called in the early part of the game, then a foul should be called in the last minute. I worried the "let the players play" mentality was a benefit to the defense, who could be more physically aggressive in the final minute without the consequence of a foul.
So is it the same in poker? If the BB would have made a big re-raise with A K early in the tournament, shouldn't he behave the same way in the late stages? I don't know, and I suspect we all may feel differently. My preference would have been to call the SB's all-in, see what the Dealer does, and then hope to check the hand down if the board is unfavorable. How did things end for the BB? He hung in valiantly for a few hands, but was ultimately knocked out by the Dealer for a third place finish.
What do you think? Is it ever okay to just fold A K, even if you don't believe you opponent has one of the top two pairs? Sound off in the comments section, and thanks for reading.
Sunday, February 13, 2011
Hand No. 4
This hand provides a good example of how to play your way into trouble with A K.
A little under one hour into a multi-table tournament. Over 300 players remain out of a starting field of 450. Blinds are 50/100. The three players involved in the hand have just over 3,000 chips, while the chip average is 2,000. The BB has been playing with a wide range of hands and his chip stack has fluctuated wildly. Player A at one time had over 7,000 chips, but had recently come back to the pack. Player E's play has been pretty standard.
Player A raises to 200. Action folds around to Player E, who calls the 200. SB folds, but BB calls the extra 100. Pot is 650 heading to the flop.
The flop shows 7h 7d 3d. BB checks, Players A & E also check.
The turn is the Ace of spades. BB checks. Player A bets 700. Player E calls 700. BB raises to 1,400. Player A goes all-in, Player E calls for the remainder of his chips. BB calls the all-in bets, and barely has the other two players covered. BB shows 9c7c, Player A shows Ac 3s, and Player E shows Ad Kd. The pot is now a little over 9,000.
The river is a useless 8 of spades. BB wins a very large pot with trip 7s. The BB now has over 9,000 chips to play with. Players A & E are knocked out of the tournament.
My thoughts on the hand:
Player A made a min-raise in first position with A 3 unsuited. As we have discussed before, this may not be enough of a raise to really define any other player's hands. Player A also had a player in the BB who had shown a willingness to play for big pots with any two cards. Nevertheless, Player A only got two callers with his raise. The flop paired Player A's 3, giving him two pair. Player A elected to check rather than make a continuation bet or a bet that could have ended the hand. The presence of two 7s on the flop made is less likely anyone else was holding a 7 (though not impossible obviously). Player A's two pair may have been the best hand at the flop, and by checking he was giving any player with 4 diamonds a free chance at their draw to a flush. But again, Player A's pre-flop raise wasn't enough to give him an idea of where he was in the hand, so he may have checked in case someone limped in with a middle pair.
Player A made a better two pair on the turn when the Ace hit, but his 3 was now his kicker, and he is probably losing to anyone who called with an Ace. Now Player A tries to define his hand with a pot-sized bet, which gets called by Player E and then raised by the BB. Player A opts to push all-in at this point. Should Player A have given up at this point in the hand? Player A still had just over 2,000 chips remaining after committing about 1,000 to the pot so far. One thing about these multi-table tourneys with so many entrants is you have to collect as many chips as possible early on to outlast the ever-increasing blinds and survive an occasional bad beat. It was probably worth it to Player A to risk the remainder of his chips to build up a large stack.
Player E elected to just call the min-raise pre-flop with suited A K. Player E experienced the same problem as Player A. That bet was not enough to get rid of the BB. In fact, Player E's call gave the BB even better pot odds to call with any two cards. A bet of 4 to 5 times the big blind may have been enough to chase out the BB, and he may have bet out Player A too. That's not much value for A K, but at least Player E would have been protecting himself from the tragedy that befell him, and still would have been alive in the tournament. Player E had an opportunity to learn more about the hand on the flop, but also elected to check. It could be argued Player E needed to bet for value with 4 cards to a flush. But Player E was being given a free opportunity to make his flush, so a check here is probably okay too.
Player E had to be excited about the Ace on the turn, as he now had top two-pair with the best kicker, as well as a draw to the nut flush. Player E is probably now committed to this hand no matter what. However, Player E only called the bet of 700 from Player A on the turn. Perhaps Player E was concerned about the presence of the BB in the hand, or could sense something was up. Player E may have been trying to keep the BB in the hand, in case he also had a weaker Ace. Player E was facing the same chip-building dilemma as the other players in the tourney, and he did have some outs in case someone was holding a 7, so (combined with the strength of his hand) his call of the all-in bet makes sense.
The BB played the hand perfectly and maximized his value for the hand. The BB had the appropriate pot odds to call the pre-flop bets with his 9 7. The flop gave him exactly what he was looking for with the trip 7s. Some may argue he needed to lead out on the flop to protect against the draw to the flush. On the other hand, his hand is so strong that the BB could probably afford to risk the draws to allow other players to improve. The BB correctly guessed the turn gave at least one of the other players a pair of Aces, so chose to spring his trap by checking the turn and then raising the bets. His raise was enough to goad the Players with an Ace to go all-in. The BB may have been better served to go all-in rather than make the minimum raise on the turn. He probably had one fish hooked, but Player E's call on the turn may have been an indication he was drawing to the flush. Nevertheless, it all worked out great for the BB.
So what do you think? Is A 3 unsuited strong enough to raise from 1st position? What should Player E have done with the AK suited pre-flop? Feel free to leave your comments, and thanks for reading.
A little under one hour into a multi-table tournament. Over 300 players remain out of a starting field of 450. Blinds are 50/100. The three players involved in the hand have just over 3,000 chips, while the chip average is 2,000. The BB has been playing with a wide range of hands and his chip stack has fluctuated wildly. Player A at one time had over 7,000 chips, but had recently come back to the pack. Player E's play has been pretty standard.
Player A raises to 200. Action folds around to Player E, who calls the 200. SB folds, but BB calls the extra 100. Pot is 650 heading to the flop.
The flop shows 7h 7d 3d. BB checks, Players A & E also check.
The turn is the Ace of spades. BB checks. Player A bets 700. Player E calls 700. BB raises to 1,400. Player A goes all-in, Player E calls for the remainder of his chips. BB calls the all-in bets, and barely has the other two players covered. BB shows 9c7c, Player A shows Ac 3s, and Player E shows Ad Kd. The pot is now a little over 9,000.
The river is a useless 8 of spades. BB wins a very large pot with trip 7s. The BB now has over 9,000 chips to play with. Players A & E are knocked out of the tournament.
My thoughts on the hand:
Player A made a min-raise in first position with A 3 unsuited. As we have discussed before, this may not be enough of a raise to really define any other player's hands. Player A also had a player in the BB who had shown a willingness to play for big pots with any two cards. Nevertheless, Player A only got two callers with his raise. The flop paired Player A's 3, giving him two pair. Player A elected to check rather than make a continuation bet or a bet that could have ended the hand. The presence of two 7s on the flop made is less likely anyone else was holding a 7 (though not impossible obviously). Player A's two pair may have been the best hand at the flop, and by checking he was giving any player with 4 diamonds a free chance at their draw to a flush. But again, Player A's pre-flop raise wasn't enough to give him an idea of where he was in the hand, so he may have checked in case someone limped in with a middle pair.
Player A made a better two pair on the turn when the Ace hit, but his 3 was now his kicker, and he is probably losing to anyone who called with an Ace. Now Player A tries to define his hand with a pot-sized bet, which gets called by Player E and then raised by the BB. Player A opts to push all-in at this point. Should Player A have given up at this point in the hand? Player A still had just over 2,000 chips remaining after committing about 1,000 to the pot so far. One thing about these multi-table tourneys with so many entrants is you have to collect as many chips as possible early on to outlast the ever-increasing blinds and survive an occasional bad beat. It was probably worth it to Player A to risk the remainder of his chips to build up a large stack.
Player E elected to just call the min-raise pre-flop with suited A K. Player E experienced the same problem as Player A. That bet was not enough to get rid of the BB. In fact, Player E's call gave the BB even better pot odds to call with any two cards. A bet of 4 to 5 times the big blind may have been enough to chase out the BB, and he may have bet out Player A too. That's not much value for A K, but at least Player E would have been protecting himself from the tragedy that befell him, and still would have been alive in the tournament. Player E had an opportunity to learn more about the hand on the flop, but also elected to check. It could be argued Player E needed to bet for value with 4 cards to a flush. But Player E was being given a free opportunity to make his flush, so a check here is probably okay too.
Player E had to be excited about the Ace on the turn, as he now had top two-pair with the best kicker, as well as a draw to the nut flush. Player E is probably now committed to this hand no matter what. However, Player E only called the bet of 700 from Player A on the turn. Perhaps Player E was concerned about the presence of the BB in the hand, or could sense something was up. Player E may have been trying to keep the BB in the hand, in case he also had a weaker Ace. Player E was facing the same chip-building dilemma as the other players in the tourney, and he did have some outs in case someone was holding a 7, so (combined with the strength of his hand) his call of the all-in bet makes sense.
The BB played the hand perfectly and maximized his value for the hand. The BB had the appropriate pot odds to call the pre-flop bets with his 9 7. The flop gave him exactly what he was looking for with the trip 7s. Some may argue he needed to lead out on the flop to protect against the draw to the flush. On the other hand, his hand is so strong that the BB could probably afford to risk the draws to allow other players to improve. The BB correctly guessed the turn gave at least one of the other players a pair of Aces, so chose to spring his trap by checking the turn and then raising the bets. His raise was enough to goad the Players with an Ace to go all-in. The BB may have been better served to go all-in rather than make the minimum raise on the turn. He probably had one fish hooked, but Player E's call on the turn may have been an indication he was drawing to the flush. Nevertheless, it all worked out great for the BB.
So what do you think? Is A 3 unsuited strong enough to raise from 1st position? What should Player E have done with the AK suited pre-flop? Feel free to leave your comments, and thanks for reading.
Tuesday, February 8, 2011
Hand No. 2 - Picture as promised, I hope
Hopefully, this worked. A picture of the Quad 10s vs. Aces full of tens.
Sunday, February 6, 2011
Hand No. 3
In my discussion of Hand No. 1, I mentioned the sandwich effect. This entry will show how concerns about the sandwich effect (and other odd things about the hand) saved my bacon.
Very early in an online tournament. Table of ten players, everyone still close to original chip stack of 1500. Blinds are 10/20. I am Player A in this discussion.
Player A has Jc Jd and is first to act pre-flop. Player A calls for 20 and Player C calls for 20. Player D raises to 40, and Player E & F call. BB calls for 40. Back to Player A who calls 40, as does Player C. Pot is 250.
Flop is 3s 8c 9c. BB leads out with a bet of 250. Player A folds, Player C folds, Player D goes all-in, Player E & Player F fold. BB calls.
BB shows pocket 8s, Player D shows pocket Aces. Turn and river are blanks. BB wins pot of 3320 with a set of 8s. Both players had and equal chip stack, so Player D is out.
My thoughts about this hand:
First of all, my play. I hate pocket Jacks, and I especially hate having to act first at a full table with pocket Jacks. They are of course worth playing, so I limped in hoping to see a flop with a bunch of low cards. The raise to 40 was easy to call. I got the flop I wanted with the 3s 8c 9c. Fortunately, I was no longer first to act. BB led out with a pot-sized bet that was very suspicious. Since he only had to call a raise of 20 from the big blind, he could have had anything at this point. My initial thought was something like A8 or A9, but two-pair, flush draw, and straight draw are also possible. At this point I seriously consider raising his bet, maybe to 500. Then I realize there are still 4 players left to act. Now, not only I am thinking about what sort of tricky, trappy hand the BB may have, I am worried about what awaits with the players behind me. Because of the pre-flop betting I have no clue as to what anyone is holding. Since I don't know where I am in the hand, and its still very early in the tournament, I decide to fold. Turns out, I was third best at this point.
Player D decided to raise only the minimum with his pocket Aces. This is a bet I see a lot in online games. Someone with Pocket Aces or Kings raises the minimum, presumably to keep players in and build the pot. However, as I've noted before, Pocket Aces are great against 1or 2 players, but against 3 or more they start to lose their value (in a playability sense - I may need to describe this concept better in a future entry). To me, the min-raise makes more sense when the blinds are a significant portion of the chip stacks, but early on your not going to drive out many hands with that raise. In this case, I'm not sure any raise would have driven out the BB with pocket 8s. And Player D may have lost all his chips in that hand no matter how it was bet. Player D's loss here could be summed up as "Well, that's poker." But I have seen this sort of betting with huge pocket pairs backfire too many times. With some limpers in front of him, I would have liked to see Player D raise 4 or 5 times the blind to whittle the field down to 2 or 3 players. And then he probably loses all his chips.
Have any opinions on how to play Pocket Jacks? What do you think of raising the minimum with Aces? Let me know in the comments section, and thanks for reading.
Very early in an online tournament. Table of ten players, everyone still close to original chip stack of 1500. Blinds are 10/20. I am Player A in this discussion.
Player A has Jc Jd and is first to act pre-flop. Player A calls for 20 and Player C calls for 20. Player D raises to 40, and Player E & F call. BB calls for 40. Back to Player A who calls 40, as does Player C. Pot is 250.
Flop is 3s 8c 9c. BB leads out with a bet of 250. Player A folds, Player C folds, Player D goes all-in, Player E & Player F fold. BB calls.
BB shows pocket 8s, Player D shows pocket Aces. Turn and river are blanks. BB wins pot of 3320 with a set of 8s. Both players had and equal chip stack, so Player D is out.
My thoughts about this hand:
First of all, my play. I hate pocket Jacks, and I especially hate having to act first at a full table with pocket Jacks. They are of course worth playing, so I limped in hoping to see a flop with a bunch of low cards. The raise to 40 was easy to call. I got the flop I wanted with the 3s 8c 9c. Fortunately, I was no longer first to act. BB led out with a pot-sized bet that was very suspicious. Since he only had to call a raise of 20 from the big blind, he could have had anything at this point. My initial thought was something like A8 or A9, but two-pair, flush draw, and straight draw are also possible. At this point I seriously consider raising his bet, maybe to 500. Then I realize there are still 4 players left to act. Now, not only I am thinking about what sort of tricky, trappy hand the BB may have, I am worried about what awaits with the players behind me. Because of the pre-flop betting I have no clue as to what anyone is holding. Since I don't know where I am in the hand, and its still very early in the tournament, I decide to fold. Turns out, I was third best at this point.
Player D decided to raise only the minimum with his pocket Aces. This is a bet I see a lot in online games. Someone with Pocket Aces or Kings raises the minimum, presumably to keep players in and build the pot. However, as I've noted before, Pocket Aces are great against 1or 2 players, but against 3 or more they start to lose their value (in a playability sense - I may need to describe this concept better in a future entry). To me, the min-raise makes more sense when the blinds are a significant portion of the chip stacks, but early on your not going to drive out many hands with that raise. In this case, I'm not sure any raise would have driven out the BB with pocket 8s. And Player D may have lost all his chips in that hand no matter how it was bet. Player D's loss here could be summed up as "Well, that's poker." But I have seen this sort of betting with huge pocket pairs backfire too many times. With some limpers in front of him, I would have liked to see Player D raise 4 or 5 times the blind to whittle the field down to 2 or 3 players. And then he probably loses all his chips.
Have any opinions on how to play Pocket Jacks? What do you think of raising the minimum with Aces? Let me know in the comments section, and thanks for reading.
Friday, February 4, 2011
Hand No. 2
I'm including this hand not because it involves any complicated poker principals, but because its the sort of hand you keep talking about for weeks and weeks. I was the dealer and sometimes you can't believe the cards that actually come off your fingers.
Late in the tournament, blinds are 500/1000. The players involved were two of the bigger stacks at the table. Action folds to Player E, who raised to 2500. Table folds to SB, who re-raises to 5000. E raised to 8300 (a proper raise in this game), SB goes all-in and Player E calls for the remainder of his chips. SB shows pocket Aces, Player E has pocket 10s. SB has Player E covered. Pot is approximately 40,000.
The flop is J A 4. Player E has no flush draw and now needs running 10s or running straight cards to win the hands. River is a 10, and Player E needs the final 10 to win and stay alive. I dealt the final 10 on the river and felt like I had been struck by lightening. Player E wins the hand with quad 10s to the SB's Aces full of 10s.
Several of the folks at the table with smart phones took the time to take a picture of the hand, and if I can figure out how to post pictures in this blog, I'll put one of them up.
There was some debate as to Player E's chances of winning the hand after the flop, whether it was 2% or 1%. All I know is it was low. I do know a better card for Player E on the turn would have been something like a Q, which would have left him with 4 Kings as outs rather than the one 10. But whatever.
I see this hand as proof that no matter how well you play on any given night, sometimes the poker gods are just out to get you.
Late in the tournament, blinds are 500/1000. The players involved were two of the bigger stacks at the table. Action folds to Player E, who raised to 2500. Table folds to SB, who re-raises to 5000. E raised to 8300 (a proper raise in this game), SB goes all-in and Player E calls for the remainder of his chips. SB shows pocket Aces, Player E has pocket 10s. SB has Player E covered. Pot is approximately 40,000.
The flop is J A 4. Player E has no flush draw and now needs running 10s or running straight cards to win the hands. River is a 10, and Player E needs the final 10 to win and stay alive. I dealt the final 10 on the river and felt like I had been struck by lightening. Player E wins the hand with quad 10s to the SB's Aces full of 10s.
Several of the folks at the table with smart phones took the time to take a picture of the hand, and if I can figure out how to post pictures in this blog, I'll put one of them up.
There was some debate as to Player E's chances of winning the hand after the flop, whether it was 2% or 1%. All I know is it was low. I do know a better card for Player E on the turn would have been something like a Q, which would have left him with 4 Kings as outs rather than the one 10. But whatever.
I see this hand as proof that no matter how well you play on any given night, sometimes the poker gods are just out to get you.
Hand No. 1
8 players at the table, relatively early in the tournament. Everyone is close to original chip stack of 16,000. Blinds are at 200/400. I am Player A in this hand and first to act pre-flop.
Player A raises to 1300 with 5s 5c. All players at the table call for 1300. The pot is now 10,400. The flop is Qd 10d 4o. BB bets 2500. Player A folds. Player B raises to 6000. Player C calls. All other players fold around to BB, who calls the additional 3500. Pot is now 28,400.
Turn is a 6o. BB checks, Player B goes all-in for final 6,300. Palyer C calls, and BB calls. BB has 1200 left. Pot is now 47,300.
River is 9o. BB checks, Palyer C puts BB all-in for 1200. BB calls. Showdown: Player B has AQ, Player C has KQ, and BB has Kd 10d. Player B wins main pot with pair of Queens, Ace kicker. Player C wins small side-pot with pair of Queens, King kicker.
Some thoughts about this hand:
My initial raise was probably a poor play. Pocket 5s are the kind of hand you like to limp in and hope to flop a set or a bunch of low cards. Once the queen and the 10 hit the board, and the with whole table left to act after me, I was done with the hand.
Player B made a good play to raise the BB's bet on the flop. The flop presented both a strait and a flush draw, and Player B had the whole table (minus Player A) to act behind him. Also, after the hand one player showed he folded pocket 6s to the raise on the flop. The turn would have given this player a set of 6s. Player Bs raise not only dissuaded the drawing hands from sticking around, but also bet out pairs below the board to prevent them from sticking around and spiking their set. 2500 may have been enticing enough for the 6s to hang around, but the raise to 6000 shoved him out.
Finally, the most interesting aspect of this hand occurred during the betting pre-flop. I raised the bet to 1300. Everyone behind me simply called the raise to 1300. I would have loved to have seen one of the last players to act put in a big re-raise, somewhere in the neighborhood of 6000 to 7500. The fact that everyone only called indicated they had decent, but not great cards. Had someone held something like pockets Qs or higher, they would have put in a raise already. Hands like that are great against one or two players, but not against an entire table. You also had people in middle position calling just because they were priced in. The pot was building 1300 chips at a time, so it would have been a decent take for someone in late position. A big re-raise from late position probably could have knocked out the marginal hands and those who called due to pot odds.
The other thing a re-raise would have going for it is something called the squeeze play or the sandwich effect. Since so many people had called already, each player left to act after the big re-raise would have had the players behind them to worry about too. Therefore it would have been harder to call the big re-raise with something less then a big pocket pair.
Opportunities like this don't come often, and its tough to put in a big re-raise if you're not holding decent cards. I recall trying this one-time and I still got one caller. Though I was ahead pre-flop, the caller outdrew me on the flop and I lost all my chips.
Feel free to share you're thoughts about this hand in the comments section. I'd be especially interested in what you have to say about the big re-raise idea. Thanks for reading.
Player A raises to 1300 with 5s 5c. All players at the table call for 1300. The pot is now 10,400. The flop is Qd 10d 4o. BB bets 2500. Player A folds. Player B raises to 6000. Player C calls. All other players fold around to BB, who calls the additional 3500. Pot is now 28,400.
Turn is a 6o. BB checks, Player B goes all-in for final 6,300. Palyer C calls, and BB calls. BB has 1200 left. Pot is now 47,300.
River is 9o. BB checks, Palyer C puts BB all-in for 1200. BB calls. Showdown: Player B has AQ, Player C has KQ, and BB has Kd 10d. Player B wins main pot with pair of Queens, Ace kicker. Player C wins small side-pot with pair of Queens, King kicker.
Some thoughts about this hand:
My initial raise was probably a poor play. Pocket 5s are the kind of hand you like to limp in and hope to flop a set or a bunch of low cards. Once the queen and the 10 hit the board, and the with whole table left to act after me, I was done with the hand.
Player B made a good play to raise the BB's bet on the flop. The flop presented both a strait and a flush draw, and Player B had the whole table (minus Player A) to act behind him. Also, after the hand one player showed he folded pocket 6s to the raise on the flop. The turn would have given this player a set of 6s. Player Bs raise not only dissuaded the drawing hands from sticking around, but also bet out pairs below the board to prevent them from sticking around and spiking their set. 2500 may have been enticing enough for the 6s to hang around, but the raise to 6000 shoved him out.
Finally, the most interesting aspect of this hand occurred during the betting pre-flop. I raised the bet to 1300. Everyone behind me simply called the raise to 1300. I would have loved to have seen one of the last players to act put in a big re-raise, somewhere in the neighborhood of 6000 to 7500. The fact that everyone only called indicated they had decent, but not great cards. Had someone held something like pockets Qs or higher, they would have put in a raise already. Hands like that are great against one or two players, but not against an entire table. You also had people in middle position calling just because they were priced in. The pot was building 1300 chips at a time, so it would have been a decent take for someone in late position. A big re-raise from late position probably could have knocked out the marginal hands and those who called due to pot odds.
The other thing a re-raise would have going for it is something called the squeeze play or the sandwich effect. Since so many people had called already, each player left to act after the big re-raise would have had the players behind them to worry about too. Therefore it would have been harder to call the big re-raise with something less then a big pocket pair.
Opportunities like this don't come often, and its tough to put in a big re-raise if you're not holding decent cards. I recall trying this one-time and I still got one caller. Though I was ahead pre-flop, the caller outdrew me on the flop and I lost all my chips.
Feel free to share you're thoughts about this hand in the comments section. I'd be especially interested in what you have to say about the big re-raise idea. Thanks for reading.
Comments
Your comments are welcome and appreciated. Please be respectful of the blogger and the commenters. Abusive comments are subject to deletion. Again, this blog is not meant to be an avenue to criticize or complain about another player's style of play. This blog is meant to be an open forum for all players, representing all levels of experience and tendencies to discuss particular hands.
The comments section can also be a place for you to suggest a hand for discussion. I ask that you mirror the style of the blog when setting up the hand. If I like your suggestion, I may create a new entry where I copy your hand and discussion into the entry.
Thank you for taking the time to read my blog. My goal is for all of us to develop a deeper understanding and appreciation of Texas Hold'em. As I often say, "I hate how much I love this game."
The comments section can also be a place for you to suggest a hand for discussion. I ask that you mirror the style of the blog when setting up the hand. If I like your suggestion, I may create a new entry where I copy your hand and discussion into the entry.
Thank you for taking the time to read my blog. My goal is for all of us to develop a deeper understanding and appreciation of Texas Hold'em. As I often say, "I hate how much I love this game."
Method
As I stated, the purpose of this blog is to discuss hands of Texas Hold'em I've recently witnessed. That means I will only discuss hands I've personally seen played at my home game, online, or on TV. Each entry will be a hand I think is worth discussion. I will not make up hypothetical hands to discuss certain Hold'em principals, such as pot odds, drawing hands, or pushing all-in. That is how some of the poker books I've read are written. Instead, we will see these principals play out in real hands, and we will see how these principals hold up.
At the start, there are cerrtain limitations we'll need to overcome. I will have to take notes in order to capture every aspect of the hand. But I will occasionally lose some details, especially in online games where hands are played very quickly. Nevertheless, I will do my best to discuss each hand fully. In addition, I realize online play differs greatly from "live" play. So sometimes the discussion of a hand from my home game may focus on how it would turn out differently if played online, and vice versa.
Out of respect to my opponents (friends) at my home game, I will reveal the hole cards of a player only if that player reveals them during the hand in discussion. Sometimes we may discuss a hand where we won't know the hole cards of a player involved in the hand. So part of the discussion could be trying to guess the hole cards based on how the hand played out.
I do intend to protect the innocent. Although, I will discuss hands from my home game, no names will be used. Perceptive players from my home game may be able to discern the players involved in a hand from the context clues, and I hope they will respect my attempts at maintaining anonymity. I will use a short-hand for players that many of you will recognize. "D" will stand for the player in the dealer position, "SB" will stand for the player in the small blind position, and "BB" will stand for the big blind. The player immediately to the left of the big blind is Player A or "A", to the left of Player A is "B," and so on around the table. The same naming convention will be used for hands from online games and TV. On exception, I will identify myself in the hands I participate in. And since I pay more attention to hands I play, we'll probably discuss a lot of my hands.
At the start, there are cerrtain limitations we'll need to overcome. I will have to take notes in order to capture every aspect of the hand. But I will occasionally lose some details, especially in online games where hands are played very quickly. Nevertheless, I will do my best to discuss each hand fully. In addition, I realize online play differs greatly from "live" play. So sometimes the discussion of a hand from my home game may focus on how it would turn out differently if played online, and vice versa.
Out of respect to my opponents (friends) at my home game, I will reveal the hole cards of a player only if that player reveals them during the hand in discussion. Sometimes we may discuss a hand where we won't know the hole cards of a player involved in the hand. So part of the discussion could be trying to guess the hole cards based on how the hand played out.
I do intend to protect the innocent. Although, I will discuss hands from my home game, no names will be used. Perceptive players from my home game may be able to discern the players involved in a hand from the context clues, and I hope they will respect my attempts at maintaining anonymity. I will use a short-hand for players that many of you will recognize. "D" will stand for the player in the dealer position, "SB" will stand for the player in the small blind position, and "BB" will stand for the big blind. The player immediately to the left of the big blind is Player A or "A", to the left of Player A is "B," and so on around the table. The same naming convention will be used for hands from online games and TV. On exception, I will identify myself in the hands I participate in. And since I pay more attention to hands I play, we'll probably discuss a lot of my hands.
Purpose
I've been playing Texas Hold'em in various "home games" for about 8 years and I've been playing online for about 4 years. I enjoy playing the game not because I get a thrill from gambling, but rather I enjoy the strategy involved in the game. One thing I miss while playing in both home games and online is discussion of the hands as they are played, a sort of post-mortem of the hands. I suppose the idea appeals to my analytical nature. Time constraints usually inhibit discussion of the hands, or sometimes there is no discussion out of deference to the loser of the hand.
The purpose of this blog is to discuss interesting hands I have seen, whether at my home game, online, or on television. I want to discuss every aspect of the hand. How it was played pre-flop, on the flop, turn, and river. What was the position of the players in the hand, their chip stacks, and the size of the pot. I want to discuss why the hand played out the way it did, and how it could have been played differently.
It is NOT the purpose of this blog to be critical of anyone's play, or style of play. Everyone makes tough decisions accounting for a number of factors, including but not limited to: experience, chips stacks, pot odds, and "gut feelings." I may state there is a better play, or a better result may have been achieved, but that is only my opinion - and I am often wrong.
This is not a teaching blog. I assume the reader has a basic understanding of the rules and strategy of Texas Hold'em. If you want to learn to play Texas Hold'em, there are a number of books and websites I can direct you to. I am not a professional poker player. You will NOT be a better player just by reading this blog. My hope is that the reader and I will develop a deeper understanding and appreciation of this wonderful game.
Subscribe to:
Comments (Atom)