This hand occurred at a live game recently. Initially I didn't think this hand was worth much discussion, but several people at the table suggested I should write about it. I've come to realize there are some interesting nuances to this hand. Sometimes we just write off hands as "that's poker." But in this case, unorthodox play and a little bad luck resulted in disaster for a particular player.
Eight players at a table where each player started with 20,000 chips. This hand was the 3rd or 4th hand of the tournament. Blinds are 100/200. Player A barely has Player C covered, but both players still have about 20,000 in chips.
Player A raises to 600. B folds. Player C re-raises to 1,300. All other players fold around to Player A, who calls the additional 700. The pot is 2,900.
The Flop is A 10 A. Player A checks, and Player C bets 2,200. Player A calls. The pot is now 7,300 chips.
The Turn is a 3. Player A checks and Player C checks behind.
The River is a 4. Player A now bets 3,500. Player C goes all-in. Player A calls. Pot is over 40,000 chips. Player A shows A 4. Player C shows A 10. Player C's full house beats Player A's full house, and Player C wins the pot.
My thoughts on the hand:
Player A's raise pre-flop may have been an attempt to thin the players in the hand. I don't like to play these types of hands, because if you pair your Ace on the flop, you then have to wonder whether you are ahead in the hand, or being outkicked by a better Ace. The 4 kicker is only going to beat a 2 or a 3 kicker, and most times won't end up being played at a the end of the hand. Your best hope to to flop two-pair, and then your going to take a bunch of chips from someone with an Ace and a strong kicker.
Player C's re-raise was also a little unsuspected. A 10 probably isn't strong enough to raise with from an early position, unless you are committed to dumping the hand if you get a big re-raise before the flop. The 10 kicker is a better than the 4 kicker, but again will be losing to most of the hands that would likely call the raise. Player A did have the pot odds to call the re-raise, though. In the end, Player C's re-raise here may have helped convince Player A he was facing a hand like A K or A Q, rah ten than A 10.
The flop was very good for both players. Player A was still losing to a hand like A K, but the presence of two aces on the board made it less likely Player C was holding the last Ace in the deck. Player A's check helped to keep the pot size manageable, and Player A's call of the 2,200 was probably correct.
The play on the turn is probably what doomed Player A in this hand. Player A checks and Player C shrewdly checks behind him. Player A would now have reason he is facing a hand like A K, or a pocket pair below the aces. This is a move you see a lot with online play. A player bets big on the flop, then checks the turn to create the impression they were just bluffing. Their opponent then makes a big bet on the flop, which works great for the online player who often made a huge hand on the flop. The alternative would be to go ahead and bet on the turn. If your opponent had any kind of hand, you will have better chances get all their chips into the pot one step at a time, rather than making a big all-in bet on the river.
The river was terrible for Player A. Player A has now made a full house. He is beating a hand like A K or even pocket 10s. After the hand, Player A mentioned Player C was holding the only hand that could beat him. Since that's the case, it probably doesn't matter how the betting took place, as both players would eventually go all-in. Still, Player A leads out for 3,500 and then Player C goes all-in for about 16,000 chips. Player C is holding the stone cold nuts, and rather than simply re-raise an amount likely to get called, say 8,000, Player C bets all-in. Of course Player A calls. Player A stated had he not caught his 4 on the river, he probably folds to the all-in bet.
So how do we account for Player C's bet on the river? The all-in is only going to be called by hands as strong as a full house, or perhaps a very strong Ace. But the betting pre-flop and throughout the hand didn't really support a hand like A K. Player C didn't talk much after the hand, so we don't know what he was thinking about Player A's hand.
The tragedy which befell Player A demonstrates the risks and possible rewards of playing so-called marginal hands like Ace with a weak kicker. Had Player A been playing against an A K, then he wins all the chips at the end of the hand. As it turns out, Player A was behind throughout the hand. Unfortunately, Player A's hand only improved as the hand progressed. Player C's betting perfectly disguised the strength of his hand. Again, the chips were probably getting all-in no matter what. There probably was no way out for Player A in this hand, other then not playing the hand in the first place. It would be easy to say "that's just poker," but there's obviously more to it than that. An astute player would take note of the interesting plays made by each player, and remember them for next time.
As always, thanks for reading, and feel free to leave your thoughts in the comments section.
Wednesday, March 23, 2011
Wednesday, March 16, 2011
Hand No. 10
This hand was interesting because it reflects some of the issues I've been discussing in recent entries.
There are 6 people in this tournament, we were short-handed at my home game this week. The blinds are 300/600. There are a couple of large stacks at the table, but most everyone is at a comfortable chip level. Player C and the Dealer have around 12,500 chips. Player C had just recently used a rebuy. I am Player C in this hand.
Player A and Player B fold. Player C raised to 1,600. The Dealer raises to 3,200. The SB and BB fold. Player C calls the additional 1,600. The pot is 7,300.
The flop is J 5 J, with two spades. Player C is first to act and bets 3,000. The Dealer quickly calls. The pot is now 13,300.
The turn is the Ace of spades. Player C checks and the Dealer pushes all-in for about 6,000. After much contemplation, Player C calls. Player C had the Dealer covered by 100 chips. Player C shows J 3, both clubs. The Dealer shows K Q, with no spades.
The river is a red 6. Player C wins a pot of approximately 25,000 with a set of Jacks.
My thoughts on the hand:
We'll start with the pre-flop raise made by Player C. This was an attempt on my part to simply steal the blinds with an otherwise unplayable hand. There are a number of factors to consider when making this type of move. You should be aware of the number of players remaining in the hand, as well as the playing tendencies of those remaining. Are they solid players, or are they players who will call a raise with a marginal hand? You also need to be able to let the hand go if you encounter serious resistance in the form of a big re-raise. You have to occasionally make this type of move to keep your opponents off-balance. If you only raise with premium hands, then you are less likely to get action from your opponents.
In this case, two players had folded ahead of me, and I figured a raise might work to collect the blinds, which at this point is not an inconsequential amount. I also have a hand I would happily dump if someone made a big re-raise. The Dealer did raise, but only raised just above the minimum. This raise may not have been designed to get me to fold, but instead reveal how strongly I felt about my hand. Since I simply called rather than put in another raise, I revealed that my hand may not be all that strong. Nevertheless, when the action came back to me it cost me 1,600 to see a flop on a potential pot of 7,300. At this point I decided to call and proceed with caution.
The flop was great for my hand. The presence of two Jacks on the board and one in my hand made it very unlikely the Dealer has a Jack as well. At this point I feel pretty good about my hand. I bet 3,000 on the flop for two reasons: 1) the presence of two spades on the board, and 2) I felt if my opponent hand an over-pair to the board, he would probably re-raise and I would be able to get all my chips into the pot with the best hand. The Dealer elected to call, which made me consider whether he had a spade draw or possibly a pocket pair lower than the Jacks.
The turn was the Ace of spades, and I made a mistake by checking rather than betting out again. I'll get to that later, but the Dealer pushing all-in was a great bet because it made me seriously consider whether he did have two spades in his hand. The bet was especially creative, because the Dealer correctly figured I would be reluctant to risk all my chips after just recently using a rebuy. If I lost this hand, I would be finished for the tournament.
I took a lot of time to consider my call. This first thing to do was to reconstruct the hand and try to figure a range of hands that the Dealer might be holding based on the betting in the hand. The Dealer made a re-raise on the flop. Again, I think this was a test raise to see how serious I was about my hand. At the time of the raise, I figured to dealer had two big cards like A K or A Q, or a high pair. The Dealer's call of my bet on the turn was suspicious - if the Dealer was holding a high pair, he may have raised again on the flop. His call suggested a drawing hand, and the only drawing hand was the spade flush draw. His all-in on the turn made sense if the Dealer was holding A K, as he may believe he now had the best hand, and wanted to discourage my potential draw to a flush. If the Dealer was trying to represent the flush on the turn, then that would have meant he made the pre-flop re-raise with something like K x or Q x of spades. In the end, that didn't make as much sense to me, and I decided the Dealer was most likely holding A K and was hoping his pair of Aces was now in the lead.
At this point, I still wasn't ready to make the call. I then had to consider the pot odds. If I truly believed the Dealer had a flush, did I have the pot odds to make a call, knowing I had potentially seven outs on the river (3 Aces, 3 Fives, 1 Jack)? The bet was 6,000 and the pot would be 25,000+ with my call. I'm not sure the pot odds were in my favor. Alternatively, I did have a big hand, and an opportunity to win a big pot. Reconstructing the hand, along with the size of the pot, ultimately led me to call the bet. It turns out the Dealer needed a 10 on the river to win the pot, and I was able to avoid disaster.
Back to my mistake on the turn. Rather than maintain control of the hand by betting out again, I opted to check to see what the Dealer would do. The Dealer's all-in bet forced me to make a tough decision for almost all of my chips. If I had bet out again, I would have been compelled to call any raise as I would have been committed to the pot. Sometimes, you can make your decisions easier by betting. By betting, I would have been creating mush better pot odds for my eventual call.
Obviously, there is an argument that my original raise pre-flop was a mistake. You can get into real trouble playing marginal hands when you catch a piece of the flop. Usually you end up committed to a pot where you have kicker problems. In this case though, the flop hit my hand so hard I had to continue on with the hand.
The Dealer's play in this hand demonstrates how you can use the board to win a pot even when you don't have a hand. The Dealer attempted to use the presence of a flush possibility to bet me off of my hand. This play works best against knowledgeable opponents. You can only make this play against someone who can recognize the hand you are representing, and will be willing to give you credit for holding the cards needed to make the hand. But even if the Dealer's play didn't work, he still had outs going to the river.
Hands like these can be pivotal in a tournament. Had I elected to give the Dealer credit for a big hand and folded, I would have been left with about 6,000 chips. With the blinds at 300/600, I only would have enough chips for about 7 rotations around the table. Instead, I was able to double up and was in a comfortable position moving forward. As always, feel free to leave your thoughts in the comments section. Thanks for reading.
There are 6 people in this tournament, we were short-handed at my home game this week. The blinds are 300/600. There are a couple of large stacks at the table, but most everyone is at a comfortable chip level. Player C and the Dealer have around 12,500 chips. Player C had just recently used a rebuy. I am Player C in this hand.
Player A and Player B fold. Player C raised to 1,600. The Dealer raises to 3,200. The SB and BB fold. Player C calls the additional 1,600. The pot is 7,300.
The flop is J 5 J, with two spades. Player C is first to act and bets 3,000. The Dealer quickly calls. The pot is now 13,300.
The turn is the Ace of spades. Player C checks and the Dealer pushes all-in for about 6,000. After much contemplation, Player C calls. Player C had the Dealer covered by 100 chips. Player C shows J 3, both clubs. The Dealer shows K Q, with no spades.
The river is a red 6. Player C wins a pot of approximately 25,000 with a set of Jacks.
My thoughts on the hand:
We'll start with the pre-flop raise made by Player C. This was an attempt on my part to simply steal the blinds with an otherwise unplayable hand. There are a number of factors to consider when making this type of move. You should be aware of the number of players remaining in the hand, as well as the playing tendencies of those remaining. Are they solid players, or are they players who will call a raise with a marginal hand? You also need to be able to let the hand go if you encounter serious resistance in the form of a big re-raise. You have to occasionally make this type of move to keep your opponents off-balance. If you only raise with premium hands, then you are less likely to get action from your opponents.
In this case, two players had folded ahead of me, and I figured a raise might work to collect the blinds, which at this point is not an inconsequential amount. I also have a hand I would happily dump if someone made a big re-raise. The Dealer did raise, but only raised just above the minimum. This raise may not have been designed to get me to fold, but instead reveal how strongly I felt about my hand. Since I simply called rather than put in another raise, I revealed that my hand may not be all that strong. Nevertheless, when the action came back to me it cost me 1,600 to see a flop on a potential pot of 7,300. At this point I decided to call and proceed with caution.
The flop was great for my hand. The presence of two Jacks on the board and one in my hand made it very unlikely the Dealer has a Jack as well. At this point I feel pretty good about my hand. I bet 3,000 on the flop for two reasons: 1) the presence of two spades on the board, and 2) I felt if my opponent hand an over-pair to the board, he would probably re-raise and I would be able to get all my chips into the pot with the best hand. The Dealer elected to call, which made me consider whether he had a spade draw or possibly a pocket pair lower than the Jacks.
The turn was the Ace of spades, and I made a mistake by checking rather than betting out again. I'll get to that later, but the Dealer pushing all-in was a great bet because it made me seriously consider whether he did have two spades in his hand. The bet was especially creative, because the Dealer correctly figured I would be reluctant to risk all my chips after just recently using a rebuy. If I lost this hand, I would be finished for the tournament.
I took a lot of time to consider my call. This first thing to do was to reconstruct the hand and try to figure a range of hands that the Dealer might be holding based on the betting in the hand. The Dealer made a re-raise on the flop. Again, I think this was a test raise to see how serious I was about my hand. At the time of the raise, I figured to dealer had two big cards like A K or A Q, or a high pair. The Dealer's call of my bet on the turn was suspicious - if the Dealer was holding a high pair, he may have raised again on the flop. His call suggested a drawing hand, and the only drawing hand was the spade flush draw. His all-in on the turn made sense if the Dealer was holding A K, as he may believe he now had the best hand, and wanted to discourage my potential draw to a flush. If the Dealer was trying to represent the flush on the turn, then that would have meant he made the pre-flop re-raise with something like K x or Q x of spades. In the end, that didn't make as much sense to me, and I decided the Dealer was most likely holding A K and was hoping his pair of Aces was now in the lead.
At this point, I still wasn't ready to make the call. I then had to consider the pot odds. If I truly believed the Dealer had a flush, did I have the pot odds to make a call, knowing I had potentially seven outs on the river (3 Aces, 3 Fives, 1 Jack)? The bet was 6,000 and the pot would be 25,000+ with my call. I'm not sure the pot odds were in my favor. Alternatively, I did have a big hand, and an opportunity to win a big pot. Reconstructing the hand, along with the size of the pot, ultimately led me to call the bet. It turns out the Dealer needed a 10 on the river to win the pot, and I was able to avoid disaster.
Back to my mistake on the turn. Rather than maintain control of the hand by betting out again, I opted to check to see what the Dealer would do. The Dealer's all-in bet forced me to make a tough decision for almost all of my chips. If I had bet out again, I would have been compelled to call any raise as I would have been committed to the pot. Sometimes, you can make your decisions easier by betting. By betting, I would have been creating mush better pot odds for my eventual call.
Obviously, there is an argument that my original raise pre-flop was a mistake. You can get into real trouble playing marginal hands when you catch a piece of the flop. Usually you end up committed to a pot where you have kicker problems. In this case though, the flop hit my hand so hard I had to continue on with the hand.
The Dealer's play in this hand demonstrates how you can use the board to win a pot even when you don't have a hand. The Dealer attempted to use the presence of a flush possibility to bet me off of my hand. This play works best against knowledgeable opponents. You can only make this play against someone who can recognize the hand you are representing, and will be willing to give you credit for holding the cards needed to make the hand. But even if the Dealer's play didn't work, he still had outs going to the river.
Hands like these can be pivotal in a tournament. Had I elected to give the Dealer credit for a big hand and folded, I would have been left with about 6,000 chips. With the blinds at 300/600, I only would have enough chips for about 7 rotations around the table. Instead, I was able to double up and was in a comfortable position moving forward. As always, feel free to leave your thoughts in the comments section. Thanks for reading.
Sunday, March 13, 2011
Rebuys
In the prior entry, I mentioned how the option to rebuy may have influenced the way a hand was played. I have decided to dedicate an entry to rebuys and how this option can affect your strategy during a tournament.
There are typically two types of rebuy options offered on tournaments. The first is unlimited rebuys until the end of a certain round of the tournament. The second is one rebuy until the end of a certain round in the tournament. A rebuy allows you to purchase an additional starting stack for the cost of the buy-in.
The first rebuy option is usually seen with an online multi-table tournament. You are typically offered unlimited rebuys until the end of one hour of play. Some of these tournaments will allow you to rebuy after your stack falls below the original starting stack, while other tournaments may require to bust out completely before you can rebuy. Often you are even offered the option to add-on during the first break. The add-on allows you to purchase a certain amount of chips for the additional cost of a buy-in. This structure allows for a significant prize pool while keeping the buy-in amounts low.
These tournaments usually have multiple players pushing all-in early and often, regardless of the strength of their holdings. The idea is to try to double up multiple times to build up a huge chip stack to play with. If you go all-in and lose, just rebuy and try again. It is very much like playing the lottery.
The problem this structure poses for a "solid" player is two-fold. First, you cannot just sit back and wait for the first hour to go by. You will be a small stack up against a lot of very big stacks. Second, even if you call an all-in with big cards, you are usually only 60% - 70% chance to win. Over the course of an hour, you are bound to lose some of these confrontations. You will be forced to rebuy and start back at your original starting stack, or just give up on the tournament.
Perhaps the best strategy is to think of these tournaments as having a buy-in of 4 to 5 times the actual buy-in. If the buy-in is $5, just imagine the buy-in is actually $20 - $30, and play accordingly. In order to remain competitive past the first hour, you will have to accumulate a lot of chips without the luxury of waiting for premium hands.
The other rebuy option you typically see in "live" games. You are offered one rebuy opportunity until the end of a certain round of play. For example, my weekly home game offers one rebuy up until the end of the 3rd round. You must lose all your chips in order to rebuy. The principle is the rebuy option allows players to survive a bad beat or two and stay alive in the tournament.
I used to think the rebuy just encouraged reckless play. I now think the rebuy option introduces some interesting strategy implications into the game, for both short stacks and big stacks. As a player's chip stack dwindles, particularly towards the end of the third round, they are faced with a choice. Do they just keep fighting and try to rebuild their stack? Or do they just push all-in hoping for a double up? Even if they lose, they can just rebuy for an original chip stack of 16,000, with the blinds are still manageable. Players in this situation should be willing to push with any two cards. Players with moderate or big chip stacks should recognize this, and their calling requirements can be loosened considerably.
As you are playing in the first 3 rounds, you need to be cognizant that the rebuy option will allow players to play drawing hands aggressively. If you are in a big hand, and suspect your opponent is drawing, you may consider betting your hand faster. Your opponent will be more likely to pay for the privilege of chasing their draws. Likewise, you are more likely to be called down with middle pairs, so again, you can bet your hand more aggressively.
I still believe the rebuy option is an overall detriment to game play. Players have a safety net, making them more willing to chase draws, call down with marginal hands, or attempt big bluffs. But consider this, if a player loses a 1/3 of his stack chasing a marginal hand, they then have less ammo to play a strong hand. If you pick up a hand, you have 10,000 in chips and double up to 20,000. If you make a conservative decision not to chase a marginal hand, you instead have 15,000 and can double up to 30,000. Now you are in a significantly better position. Of course, this is the case against playing marginal hands, irrespective of a rebuy option.
How does a rebuy affect your strategy? Feel free to share in the comments section, and thanks for reading.
There are typically two types of rebuy options offered on tournaments. The first is unlimited rebuys until the end of a certain round of the tournament. The second is one rebuy until the end of a certain round in the tournament. A rebuy allows you to purchase an additional starting stack for the cost of the buy-in.
The first rebuy option is usually seen with an online multi-table tournament. You are typically offered unlimited rebuys until the end of one hour of play. Some of these tournaments will allow you to rebuy after your stack falls below the original starting stack, while other tournaments may require to bust out completely before you can rebuy. Often you are even offered the option to add-on during the first break. The add-on allows you to purchase a certain amount of chips for the additional cost of a buy-in. This structure allows for a significant prize pool while keeping the buy-in amounts low.
These tournaments usually have multiple players pushing all-in early and often, regardless of the strength of their holdings. The idea is to try to double up multiple times to build up a huge chip stack to play with. If you go all-in and lose, just rebuy and try again. It is very much like playing the lottery.
The problem this structure poses for a "solid" player is two-fold. First, you cannot just sit back and wait for the first hour to go by. You will be a small stack up against a lot of very big stacks. Second, even if you call an all-in with big cards, you are usually only 60% - 70% chance to win. Over the course of an hour, you are bound to lose some of these confrontations. You will be forced to rebuy and start back at your original starting stack, or just give up on the tournament.
Perhaps the best strategy is to think of these tournaments as having a buy-in of 4 to 5 times the actual buy-in. If the buy-in is $5, just imagine the buy-in is actually $20 - $30, and play accordingly. In order to remain competitive past the first hour, you will have to accumulate a lot of chips without the luxury of waiting for premium hands.
The other rebuy option you typically see in "live" games. You are offered one rebuy opportunity until the end of a certain round of play. For example, my weekly home game offers one rebuy up until the end of the 3rd round. You must lose all your chips in order to rebuy. The principle is the rebuy option allows players to survive a bad beat or two and stay alive in the tournament.
I used to think the rebuy just encouraged reckless play. I now think the rebuy option introduces some interesting strategy implications into the game, for both short stacks and big stacks. As a player's chip stack dwindles, particularly towards the end of the third round, they are faced with a choice. Do they just keep fighting and try to rebuild their stack? Or do they just push all-in hoping for a double up? Even if they lose, they can just rebuy for an original chip stack of 16,000, with the blinds are still manageable. Players in this situation should be willing to push with any two cards. Players with moderate or big chip stacks should recognize this, and their calling requirements can be loosened considerably.
As you are playing in the first 3 rounds, you need to be cognizant that the rebuy option will allow players to play drawing hands aggressively. If you are in a big hand, and suspect your opponent is drawing, you may consider betting your hand faster. Your opponent will be more likely to pay for the privilege of chasing their draws. Likewise, you are more likely to be called down with middle pairs, so again, you can bet your hand more aggressively.
I still believe the rebuy option is an overall detriment to game play. Players have a safety net, making them more willing to chase draws, call down with marginal hands, or attempt big bluffs. But consider this, if a player loses a 1/3 of his stack chasing a marginal hand, they then have less ammo to play a strong hand. If you pick up a hand, you have 10,000 in chips and double up to 20,000. If you make a conservative decision not to chase a marginal hand, you instead have 15,000 and can double up to 30,000. Now you are in a significantly better position. Of course, this is the case against playing marginal hands, irrespective of a rebuy option.
How does a rebuy affect your strategy? Feel free to share in the comments section, and thanks for reading.
Saturday, March 12, 2011
Hand No. 9
Some hands will result in all-in confrontations no matter how they play out. However there are some interesting nuances to the following hand.
This hand occurred in the same tournament as Hand No. 8. Blinds are 200/400. Its still early in the tournament, but the Dealer and Player C have big stacks of approximately 30,000 chips. Player A calls for 400. Player C raises to 1,200, and Players D, E, & F all call for 1,200. The Dealer re-raises to 3,600. The SB calls for his final 2,700, but this does not cap the action. Player A folds, and Player C re-raises all in for about 30,000 chips. Players D, E, & F all fold. The Dealer calls for the remainder of his chips, also around 30,000 chips, but he is covered by Player C. The Dealer shows pocket Aces, the SB shows pocket 7s, and Player C shows pocket Kings. The pot is over 60,000.
The flop is K 10 8, with two spades. The turn is a 7 and the river is a 4. There are no flushes possible. Player C wins the pot with a set of Kings. The Dealer and SB are forced to rebuy or be knocked out of the tournament. This game allows one rebuy until the end of the 3rd round of play.
My thoughts on this hand:
Player C was immediately on my left in this tournament. Player C revealed after this hand that he "felt like" the Dealer would show pocket Aces after the initial re-raise. So should have Player C have trusted his instincts and laid down his pocket Kings? I have read a number of times about players who laid down pocket Kings when they just knew their opponent had to have pocket Aces. It depends on the circumstances, but I don't know if I could ever fold pocket Kings before the flop.
Player C did have other options when facing the re-raise from the Dealer. Player C could have just called and re-evaluated his hand after the flop. Its immaterial though, as all the chips would have gotten into the pot after the flop. Player C also could have re-raised before the flop - say to 10,000. But at this point he would have committed a 1/3 of his stack to a hand that would have been very difficult to get away from. Interestingly, if Player C had elected to let the hand go, the SB would have survived his all-in when he made a set of 7s on the turn.
As for the Dealer, I've expressed my opinion about playing pocket Aces before, so I won't belabor the point. The Dealer was facing 4 opponents who had already committed 1,200 to the pot. The Dealer needed to make a bigger re-raise to narrow the field a bit. Of course, in this instance luck wasn't on his side anyway. Player C wasn't going to fold to any bet.
The rebuy option probably influenced the play of this hand. Both Player C and the SB had the safety net of the rebuy. In the case of the SB, he was facing a raise, 3 callers, and a big re-raise. It was unlikely his pocket 7s were good at this point. But for his final 2,700 he had a shot at winning a pot approaching 10,000. And if he didn't get lucky, he could just rebuy to get another starting stack of 16,000. I'll probably dedicate a future entry to the rebuy concept. Rebuys and add-ons not only increase the prize pool, but they affect your strategy as the tournament progresses.
Sometimes I think the name of this blog should be "Aces Are No Good." We never remember when they hold up, only when they get crushed. Feel free to share your bad beat stories in the comments section, and thanks for reading.
This hand occurred in the same tournament as Hand No. 8. Blinds are 200/400. Its still early in the tournament, but the Dealer and Player C have big stacks of approximately 30,000 chips. Player A calls for 400. Player C raises to 1,200, and Players D, E, & F all call for 1,200. The Dealer re-raises to 3,600. The SB calls for his final 2,700, but this does not cap the action. Player A folds, and Player C re-raises all in for about 30,000 chips. Players D, E, & F all fold. The Dealer calls for the remainder of his chips, also around 30,000 chips, but he is covered by Player C. The Dealer shows pocket Aces, the SB shows pocket 7s, and Player C shows pocket Kings. The pot is over 60,000.
The flop is K 10 8, with two spades. The turn is a 7 and the river is a 4. There are no flushes possible. Player C wins the pot with a set of Kings. The Dealer and SB are forced to rebuy or be knocked out of the tournament. This game allows one rebuy until the end of the 3rd round of play.
My thoughts on this hand:
Player C was immediately on my left in this tournament. Player C revealed after this hand that he "felt like" the Dealer would show pocket Aces after the initial re-raise. So should have Player C have trusted his instincts and laid down his pocket Kings? I have read a number of times about players who laid down pocket Kings when they just knew their opponent had to have pocket Aces. It depends on the circumstances, but I don't know if I could ever fold pocket Kings before the flop.
Player C did have other options when facing the re-raise from the Dealer. Player C could have just called and re-evaluated his hand after the flop. Its immaterial though, as all the chips would have gotten into the pot after the flop. Player C also could have re-raised before the flop - say to 10,000. But at this point he would have committed a 1/3 of his stack to a hand that would have been very difficult to get away from. Interestingly, if Player C had elected to let the hand go, the SB would have survived his all-in when he made a set of 7s on the turn.
As for the Dealer, I've expressed my opinion about playing pocket Aces before, so I won't belabor the point. The Dealer was facing 4 opponents who had already committed 1,200 to the pot. The Dealer needed to make a bigger re-raise to narrow the field a bit. Of course, in this instance luck wasn't on his side anyway. Player C wasn't going to fold to any bet.
The rebuy option probably influenced the play of this hand. Both Player C and the SB had the safety net of the rebuy. In the case of the SB, he was facing a raise, 3 callers, and a big re-raise. It was unlikely his pocket 7s were good at this point. But for his final 2,700 he had a shot at winning a pot approaching 10,000. And if he didn't get lucky, he could just rebuy to get another starting stack of 16,000. I'll probably dedicate a future entry to the rebuy concept. Rebuys and add-ons not only increase the prize pool, but they affect your strategy as the tournament progresses.
Sometimes I think the name of this blog should be "Aces Are No Good." We never remember when they hold up, only when they get crushed. Feel free to share your bad beat stories in the comments section, and thanks for reading.
Hand No. 8
This entry will demonstrate why pot odds are such an important aspect of Texas Hold'em. Pot odds should be considered in every hand you play, rather than relying solely on the strength of the cards of your hand.
First hand of a live game tournament. Ten players at the table with starting stacks of 16,000 chips, and blinds start at 100/200. I am the player in the SB, and I have K 4 unsuited.
Player A folds. Players B & C call for 200. Player D folds. Players E, F, & G call for 200, as do the Dealer and the SB. The BB raises to 800. As the BB makes this raise, I unfortunately state his raise is unlikely to eliminate any of the players who limped. All players except the SB call for 800. The pot is 5,800.
The flop is K 9 4, with two clubs. The BB checks. Player B bets 800 and Player C calls. All other players fold around to the BB who calls for 800. The pot is now 8,200.
The turn is the Ace of diamonds. The BB now leads out with a bet of 1,500. Player B folds and Player C calls. The pot is now 11,200.
The river is the 7 of spades. The BB checks and Player C checks as well. The BB shows A 10 unsuited, Player C shows 8 9. The BB wins the pot of 11,200.
My thoughts on the hand:
Generally, if someone limps into the pot from early position, it creates a domino effect, with each successive limper creating better pot odds for the next player. By the time the action got around to the SB initially, he only needed to call 100 for a potential pot of 1,600. The initial call was correct, even with K 4 unsuited, and it would have been correct for any two cards.
The BB held A 10 unsuited and faced two choices. The BB could check and see a flop on a decent sized pot for no extra investment. But the BB would then have a positional disadvantage after the flop. Alternatively, the BB could raise, sensing that a number of the limpers had marginal hands. A raise would also help his positional disadvantage as well by causing any callers to be hesitant to bet after the flop. A 10 is also the type of hand that can get you into trouble, so a raise here would help better define the type of hands he is facing. But the BB only raises 800, which is not enough to drive out the other players, except for the SB. Player B not only had the express odds to call (600 for a pot of 2,800), but the implied odds made the call that much easier. Player B could infer that several of the players behind him would call, as each call would improve the pot odds for the next player.
Putting aside the strength of his hand, if the BB were inclined to raise pre-flop in this situation, a much stiffer raise would be needed to drive out some of the marginal hands - somewhere in the neighborhood of 150% to 200% of the pot. There is a slight risk one of the early players limped with a big pair, hoping for a re-raise. But a bigger raise would have given the BB a better idea of what he was facing.
So imagine the SB's dismay when the flop hit. The SB folded K 4, and the flop would have given him two pair, which it turns out would have been the best hand. So why did the SB fold to the raise before the flop? After the BB raised pre-flop, all the players already in the hand called. Therefore, it would cost the SB 600 to see a flop for a pot of 6,400. Those are pot odds of over 10 to 1. The SB need to call with any two cards at this point. And it turns out the minuscule odds would pay off for the SB. So what happened?
Several things were going through my mind. First, it was the first hand of the night. I wasn't quite "settled" and ready to play at this point. I simply failed to consider the pot odds. Calling the initial 100 was a "no-brainer", but the raise made me dump my worthless cards. Second, it was early, and I figured a K on the flop would only lose me more chips to a better K, and it was unlikely a 4 on the flop would help me. And finally, I was feeling a bit sheepish about my warning to the BB on the size of his bet. I generally try to discourage this type of "table talk", so I felt like I should get out of the hand to make up for my error.
Pot odds have to be a component of your poker game. Calculating pot odds can actually make your decisions easier. But you have to have the discipline to let the hand go if the flop doesn't connect with your cards or if you meet any real resistance. When you do connect, you have to make sure you get maximum value for your hand to off-set the times you pay to see the flop and don't connect.
Beneath the skill it takes to read your opponents or to pull off outrageous bluffs, poker is a gambling. To win a tournament you have to be willing to gamble, and pot odds help you to pick your spots so that your gambles will pay off in the long run.
Math is hard. Got any tips for calculating pot odds? Feel free to leave your thoughts in the comments section, and thanks for reading.
First hand of a live game tournament. Ten players at the table with starting stacks of 16,000 chips, and blinds start at 100/200. I am the player in the SB, and I have K 4 unsuited.
Player A folds. Players B & C call for 200. Player D folds. Players E, F, & G call for 200, as do the Dealer and the SB. The BB raises to 800. As the BB makes this raise, I unfortunately state his raise is unlikely to eliminate any of the players who limped. All players except the SB call for 800. The pot is 5,800.
The flop is K 9 4, with two clubs. The BB checks. Player B bets 800 and Player C calls. All other players fold around to the BB who calls for 800. The pot is now 8,200.
The turn is the Ace of diamonds. The BB now leads out with a bet of 1,500. Player B folds and Player C calls. The pot is now 11,200.
The river is the 7 of spades. The BB checks and Player C checks as well. The BB shows A 10 unsuited, Player C shows 8 9. The BB wins the pot of 11,200.
My thoughts on the hand:
Generally, if someone limps into the pot from early position, it creates a domino effect, with each successive limper creating better pot odds for the next player. By the time the action got around to the SB initially, he only needed to call 100 for a potential pot of 1,600. The initial call was correct, even with K 4 unsuited, and it would have been correct for any two cards.
The BB held A 10 unsuited and faced two choices. The BB could check and see a flop on a decent sized pot for no extra investment. But the BB would then have a positional disadvantage after the flop. Alternatively, the BB could raise, sensing that a number of the limpers had marginal hands. A raise would also help his positional disadvantage as well by causing any callers to be hesitant to bet after the flop. A 10 is also the type of hand that can get you into trouble, so a raise here would help better define the type of hands he is facing. But the BB only raises 800, which is not enough to drive out the other players, except for the SB. Player B not only had the express odds to call (600 for a pot of 2,800), but the implied odds made the call that much easier. Player B could infer that several of the players behind him would call, as each call would improve the pot odds for the next player.
Putting aside the strength of his hand, if the BB were inclined to raise pre-flop in this situation, a much stiffer raise would be needed to drive out some of the marginal hands - somewhere in the neighborhood of 150% to 200% of the pot. There is a slight risk one of the early players limped with a big pair, hoping for a re-raise. But a bigger raise would have given the BB a better idea of what he was facing.
So imagine the SB's dismay when the flop hit. The SB folded K 4, and the flop would have given him two pair, which it turns out would have been the best hand. So why did the SB fold to the raise before the flop? After the BB raised pre-flop, all the players already in the hand called. Therefore, it would cost the SB 600 to see a flop for a pot of 6,400. Those are pot odds of over 10 to 1. The SB need to call with any two cards at this point. And it turns out the minuscule odds would pay off for the SB. So what happened?
Several things were going through my mind. First, it was the first hand of the night. I wasn't quite "settled" and ready to play at this point. I simply failed to consider the pot odds. Calling the initial 100 was a "no-brainer", but the raise made me dump my worthless cards. Second, it was early, and I figured a K on the flop would only lose me more chips to a better K, and it was unlikely a 4 on the flop would help me. And finally, I was feeling a bit sheepish about my warning to the BB on the size of his bet. I generally try to discourage this type of "table talk", so I felt like I should get out of the hand to make up for my error.
Pot odds have to be a component of your poker game. Calculating pot odds can actually make your decisions easier. But you have to have the discipline to let the hand go if the flop doesn't connect with your cards or if you meet any real resistance. When you do connect, you have to make sure you get maximum value for your hand to off-set the times you pay to see the flop and don't connect.
Beneath the skill it takes to read your opponents or to pull off outrageous bluffs, poker is a gambling. To win a tournament you have to be willing to gamble, and pot odds help you to pick your spots so that your gambles will pay off in the long run.
Math is hard. Got any tips for calculating pot odds? Feel free to leave your thoughts in the comments section, and thanks for reading.
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